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ABSTRACT 
This study examined the effect of board nationality and ethnic diversity on firms’ performance in 
the Nigeria stock exchange. With the aim of investigating the level of influence ethnic diversity 
and board nationality would affect firm performance in terms of profitability and growth in a 
developing economy, the study made use of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q for financial measures.  
The study analysed date from 60 non-financial firms with periodic observations from 2012-2015 
using the ordinary least squares regression method. Yemeni formula was used to calculate the 
sample size out of the remainder 119 listed non-financial after 57 listed firms from the financial 
sector were removed. The total sample size was further streamlined to 60 based on a common 
reporting period (January 1st to December 31st) to ensure consistency. The Findings indicate 
that ethnic diversity and board nationality has no significant influence on the performance level 
of firms in both profitability (ROA and ROE) and growth (Tobin’s Q). Findings also reveal that 
the average board size of the listed non financial firms in Nigeria meets the countries corporate 
governance requirement of nine (9) members and the average board has a combination of at 
least two of the three ethnic groups in Nigeria. The board composition of sampled firms still 
reveals the presence of family members in same board which is against the central board 
composition code of corporate governance. This study encourages a diverse board since there is 
no significant effect on financial based performance; it is still advisable to be diverse except cost 
outweighs benefits. Diversity always tends to have effects on the way the board members make a 
decision, or strategic moves. It sets a control, brings innovation and could also slow down the 
rate of decision making. 
Key words: Ethnic diversity, Board nationality, financial performance, Corporate Governance 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Board diversity in corporate governance structure is beginning to be of growing importance 
when it comes to the interest of shareholders and firm performance nowadays. With evidence 
shown from notable studies from, (Erhardt, Werbek & Shrader, 2003; Lee & Far, 2004; Bergen 
& Massey, 2005; Robertson & parker, 2007: Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Ferreira, 2010). Recently, scholars like: (Marimuthu, 2011; Darmadi, 2011; Omoye, Alade, & 
Eriki, 2013; Cimerovaa, Dodda, & Frijnsa, 2014), and much more have also investigated board 
diversity and its effects to an entity. There is an accelerated focus on the study of board 
composition: board independence; board size and board diversity, (Carter, Simikins & Simpson, 
2003; Erhardt, Werbek & Shrader, 2003; Garba & Abubakar, 2014 & Heyvon, 2014).  
The promotion of diversity in the board has been a frequent subject of recent in literature due to 
the potential benefits from having a wealth of different individual quality and experience on in a 
single board. Hambick & Mason, (1984), observed that management heterogeneity has a greater 
tendency to bring about quality decision making. Similarly, with Hambick and Mason, Other 
studies such as that of Wiersema & Bantel (1992); Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, (1993); Cox, 
(1993) has also spelt out the importance of corporate board diversity. The work of Adams & 
Ferreira, (2009) in particular highlighted the potential benefits of corporate board diversity to a 
firm as it brings about: Creativity, variety of views and perspectives; more resource accessibility 
and more connections; Public relations, legitimacy and investor relations and finally career 
incentives through mentoring and signaling.  
Carter, D’souza, Simkins, & Simpson (2007) looked into Fortune 500 board narrowing their 
scope by using gender and racial diversity between the year 1998-2002 and they observed that 
gender and racial diversity have positive effects on firms' performance. However, various forms 
of diversity, such as race, sex, age, and ethnicity could result in tension, conflict, and hinder 
corporation and affect communication thereby reducing firm’s performance. This satisfies the 
definition of Ferreira, (2010) that a corporate board of a firm is viewed as the composition of 
separate individuals who are controlled by different bias and varying preconceived notions and 
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are affected by social constraint & power relation. Diversity in culture is the representation of 
people of distinct groups of affiliation in one social system, Cox, (1993). These definitions have 
been reflective in the empirical work of Darmadi (2011) who investigated listed firms in 
Indonesia stock exchange between the diversity of the board and financial performance of the 
firms. In his study, he selected three elements of diversity which are gender, nationality, and age, 
using 169 listed firms and discovered that there was no influence of diversity on firm’s 
performance. Also, Cultural Heterogeneity may have also resulted in conflicts which have 
enhanced the performance of an organization; it is linked positively with better problem-solving 
options, Omoye, Alade, & Eriki (2013).  
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Several countries such as Norway (since 2006, 40% of the board are female), Spain, Iceland, 
France, Singapore  and Malaysia (30% of the board are female)  have succeeded in passing a 
regulation for a specific quota of female in board, Adam & Ferreira, (2009); Ahern & Dittmer, 
(2012); Heyvon, (2014), of which many countries are yet to implement their percentage quota. 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of diversity (apart from gender) such as ethnic, racial, education, 
Industrial background seem neglected in determining board composition. The central thought 
should be, is there a perfect prescription as pertaining to the diversity in corporate board? 
Authors such as Metz & Harzing, (2009); Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, (2009); Matlala, (2011); 
have laid emphasis on the importance of female directors and their positive effect on 
performance and earnings. The term board diversity cuts across so many variables such as age, 
race, gender, culture, religion, the level of education and background experience Swartz & Firer, 
(2005); Ferreira (2010); Kulkarni, (2012).  
In view against corporate failures in all over the world, countries have been taking critical steps 
to ensure prevention of future occurrences, and one of such measure is diversity in board of 
corporate firms. These steps/measures were taken to strengthen corporate governance in firms, 
especially those listed. One of such actions was CEO duality brought into recognition, separating 
the role of a chairman from that of a typical CEO. The separation of the responsibilities of CEO 
from Chairman of a board, executives, non-executive, and independent non-executive directors 
are forms of diversity. Walker, (2007) review was based on board size and Composition in FTSE 
100 and UK banks and a prescribed 50% independent directors rule was proposed. In 2016, 
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Parker review, (2016) was issued by Earnest and Young and the major resounding voice echoed 
the necessity for racial and ethnical diversity in board. (Margot; made a speech, November 2, 
2016) at Sir, parker’s dinner made a statistics of 1.5% of board members in the FTSE 100 are 
black and minority ethnic and majority of the firm's board has white ethnic at the whole board 
composition. This is a sign of deficiency in racial and ethnic diversity in UK board.  
Margot, in 2016; made a speech at Sir, Parker’s dinner, November 2, 2016, he stated that: 
     “People from different backgrounds bring different experiences and 
perspectives, and it’s long been recognized that greater diversity in the boardroom 
can help create constructive and challenging dialogue. Having this diversity around 
the table helps ensure the board will fulfil its duties to the fullest and take well-
grounded decisions.”   
Giving the effects of ethnic groups in a country like Nigeria, leading to tribalism and 
discrimination. A Dearth of literature has been written on the effects of the board, ethnic 
diversity on firms' performance, Omoye, Alade & Eriki, (2013). Foreign expert rate is a part of 
UK corporate governance and other countries have incorporated it into their books. For instance, 
Richard, (2000) looking at ethnic and racial diversity, were able to draw out the inference that 
foreign investor, board participation increases performance of firms in Korea, Ruigrok, peck & 
Tacheva (2007) also observed that in Swiss corporation, foreign directors tend to be more 
independent. This study has a direction towards investigating the possible influences that 
national and ethnic diversity has on the performance of the firm. Unlike previous studies such as 
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Marimuthu & Koladaisamy 2009), have dwelt on gender 
diversity, board independence and focused on the whole listed firm as well as listed banks in a 
country. Other studies have been able capture and make use of financial performance parameters 
lie profitability ( ROE, ROA, ROI etc.) and  Market value ( Tobin’s Q, Earnings predictability, 
earnings management etc.), but non have been able to look at the growth aspect of financial 
performance dealing with market share growth and asset growth. To the best of knowledge, no 
prior literature have been able to compare this study among various industries and non has made 
use of non-financial measures. No Nigerian based study has examined data from post-IFRS 
periods concerning this study or has made a comparative study between the pre-IFRS and pos-
IFRS. This study is concerned about investigating the listed firms in Nigeria except for the firms 
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that belong to the financial service industry. This study makes use of financial performance 
profitability indicator such as ROE, ROA and financial growth indicators such Tobin’s Q ratio 
for financial performance measurement. The study also differs from prior Nigerian based studies 
due to the fact that it pulls from post-IFRS data. Also, its method of data analysis and stationary 
test which will make use of ordinary least square panel regression random model and unit root 
test respectively. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The following research questions are used to structure the research objective. The research 
questions direct the researcher into giving answers to the study's overall objective as shown 
below. 
1) What level of influence does ethnic diversity have on the firms’ performance? 
2) How can the presence of foreign directors affect firms’ performance? 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study is aimed at investigating the influence board diversity has on the earnings persistence 
of firms. The streamlining of board diversity in board size, national and ethnic diversity furthers 
breaks the main objective into specific objectives which are to: 
1) Determine the influence of ethnic diversity on firms’ performance. 
2) Ascertain whether the presence of foreign directors affects firm’s performance. 
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
1) H0: Ethnic diversity has no significant effect on firms’ performance 
2) H0: The presence of foreign directors has no significant influence on firms’ performance  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
This study firstly tries to explain the possible influence of board nationality, size and ethnic 
diversity on the performance of a firm. The performance of a firm is critical to its eventual health 
and life span. Two key contributions are made in this study. Firstly, we make contributions to the 
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culture and finance literature by providing bedrock can be used as a base in the assessment of the 
impact of Nationality and ethnicity within a board of a firm. Second, we contribute to the 
literature on board diversity (which has predominantly focused on board independence and 
gender diversity) by introducing cultural diversity in the form of ethnic diversity, a thus-far 
overlooked aspect of board diversity. Thus far, the lens through which boards of directors have 
been viewed is board size and proportion of independent directors (Coles et al., 2007; Dennis 
and Sarin, 1999; Anderson et al., 2000). Potential users of this research, such as shareholders, 
students, researchers, management and board of sampled firms would be able, to observe trends 
based on the effects of each of the independent variables (board nationality, board ethnic 
diversity) on the dependent variable firms' performance. This will be able to influence the BOD 
and shareholders' decisions on future director appointments in firms, of which could benefit the 
interest of shareholders. Lastly, this study would help improve corporate governance in firms and 
will help push researchers into future investigations  
This study has great significance due to the fact that few studies of this nature have been carried 
out in African countries and other less developing countries like. Similarity based on Hofstede 
(1980, 1983), Schwartz (1994, 2007) and Gray (1988) cultural areas of cultural distance, 
landmark studies which were able to explain the evolution of accounting subculture influenced 
by societal values. From the division of cultural areas into: (1) more developed Latin. (2) Less 
developed Latin. (3) More developed Asian. (4) Less developed Asian (5) near eastern (6) 
African (7) Germanic (8) Anglo (9) Asian-colonial and (10) Nordic. From this we could deduce 
that if this study covers the scope of Nigeria then it represents the whole “African”. The reason 
being that the cultural values for “African” are the same. Harvested (1980, 1983) cultural values 
are: Individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity.  (a) Measurement and 
disclosure: optimism, conservatism, transparency and secrecy (b) Authority and enforcement: 
statutory control, flexibility, uniformity and professionalism. The “African” is characterized by 
secrecy and conservatism based on measurement and disclosure and based on authority and 
enforcement: statutory control and uniformity so Nigeria could be a minute representation of 
Africa based on Gray, (1988) and Hofstede, (1983) 
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1.6 JUSTIFICATION OF STUDY 
The wake of previous scandals in Nigeria and necessary improvement needed in proper 
governance, acting in the interest of shareholders. Prior studies on cultural diversity such as 
(Cimerovaa, Dodd & Frijnsa, 2014; Cox, 1993; Marimuthu & Koladaisamy, 2009; Marimuthu, 
2011; Mazur & Białostocka, 2010; and Nederveen, Van Knippenberg & Van Diererdonck 2013) 
have been studies conducted outside of Nigeria; this study is taking a deep look at the Nigerian 
stock exchange. 
The recent parker review made emphasis on a research work by (Atewologun, 2016) on the low 
representation of ethnic minorities in the UK board, several implications and solutions where 
prescribed. This is scarcely being viewed and visited in countries with individuals of diverse 
ethnic backgrounds such as Nigeria. A very few, to the best of knowledge, have laid emphasis on 
the possible effect of ethnic diversity (Omoye, Alade, & Eriki, 2013).  However, most of the 
empirical research on board diversity was mainly derived from the developed countries’ 
perspective, such as the U.S. (Hillman et al. 2002; Gul et al. 2011), the U.K. (Conyon & Mallin 
1997; Brammer et al. 2007) and Australia (Nguyen & Faff 2006; Kang et al. 2007). Owing to the 
differences between the developed and the developing countries, for examples, in terms of their 
regulatory, cultural, economic environments, size of capital markets and effectiveness of 
governance mechanism (Aguilera 2005; Kang et al. 2007; Petrovic 2008; Li & Harrison 2008; 
Veen & Elbertsen 2008), more evidence should be drawn from the developing countries, in a 
way to contribute to the limited literature on board diversity. Rather than relying on research 
results from other countries, researchers need to take national circumstances into account in 
examining board diversity (Ruigrok et al. 2007) 
1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The study covers the whole listed firms in Nigeria stock exchange with the exclusion of the 
financial service sector/industry, cutting across all the remainder, ten industries which are a total 
of 119 { 176  (total)  –  57 (financial service sector) } firms as at the time of the study. The study 
is limited to the sample size of at least 5% of the total number of listed firms as supported by 
(Krejecie & Morgan, 1970). A systematical approach was used in selecting samples from each 
industrial sector on the stock exchange, of which about 50% samples each were selected from 
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each industry so as to avoid bias. The study is narrowed down to board nationality and ethnic 
diversity as an aspect of board diversity. The study made use of financial measurement variable; 
specifically profitability and growth variables. The profitability variables used are ROE and 
ROA, while the growth variable used is TOBIN’S Q ratio. The ROE, ROA and Tobin Q formula 
would be used to calculate the value of the firm’s level of financial performance.  Panel data 
regression will be used to determine the relationship, degree of movement and level of influence 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables.  
1.8 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Agent: An individual put in charge of a particular venture, business, undertaking and property, 
to represent the owner in management, maintenance and is expected to make accounts to the 
owner for activities/occurrences (positive or negative) affecting such property transparently. 
Unlike stewards, this individual is assumed to usually make action to feed his/her personal 
interest rather than that of the owner. 
Agency theory: This theory makes the assumption of a conflicting relationship that exist 
between the principal and agent, where the agent has more knowledge of the business than the 
principal. Agency theory identifies the conflicting interest between both parties and seeks to 
solve them. 
Board: A composition of directors both executive and non-executive of firm. 
Board diversity: The composition of board members of a firm with a different background, 
gender, race, culture, work experience, age, education, and skill composition.  
Board Nationality:  Existence of members of board from various nations in a corporate board. 
This is the ratio of foreign board members to total board size. The potential advantages of 
foreign board membership have received serious attention in corporate governance studies 
globally  
Board size: Number of board members of a corporate board, which includes directors both 
executive and non-executive of the firm. 
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Corporate Governance: The methods by which suppliers of finance control managers in order 
to ensure that their capital cannot be expropriated and that they earn a return on their investment. 
Company: A group of organized individuals that have come together, and are registered as a 
firm, with the aim of pulling factor of production together and running business activities for 
profit making. (See Firm) 
Diversity: A range of different individuals of different gender, background, race, ethnic group 
and nationality.  
Ethnic diversity: Combination of large group of people with different heritage, origin, and race  
Ex post factor: A research design is a method in which groups with qualities that already exist 
are compared on some dependent variable. Also known as "after the fact" research, an ex post 
facto design is considered quasi-experimental because the subjects are not randomly assigned - 
they are grouped based on a particular characteristic or trait 
Firm: A company registered and established with the sole aim of profit making.  
Financial performance: Quantitative reflection of the periodic financial state and the health of a 
firm usually revealed in a financial report. This is a measure of how well a firm can use assets 
from its primary mode of business and generate revenues. This term is also used as a general 
measure of a firm's overall financial health over a given period of time. 
Financial report: A yearly document showing the health status of a firm. Prepared by a firm 
with the purpose of revealing the true and fair total health status of the firm. This document is 
material to the stakeholder’s decision.  
Mean: Mean is the average value of the series, obtained by adding up the series and dividing by 
the number of observations. 
Median: Median is the middle value (or average of the two middle values) of the series when the 
values are ordered from the smallest to the largest. The median is a robust measure of the center 
of the distribution that is less sensitive to outliers than the mean 
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Panel data: Also known as cross-sectional time series data (longitudinal data) data derived from 
a number of observation overtime on a large number of cross-sectional units like individual, 
government, firm or household 
Resource dependency theory: The theory stresses that, board members with different skills, 
different cultural backgrounds, different gender, among others, will act as a strategic resource to 
the firm which may result in superior performance  
Return on asset: A measure of a company's profitability, equal to a fiscal year's earnings 
divided by its total assets, expressed as a percentage 
Return on equity: A measure of how well a company used reinvested earnings to generate 
additional earnings, equal to a fiscal year's after-tax income (after preferred stock dividends but 
before common stock dividends) divided by book value, expressed as a percentage. 
Shareholder: Shareholders are people who have bought shares in a limited liability company. 
They own a part of the company in exact proportion to the proportion of the shares they own. 
Individuals or persons that own a portion or percentage of a company’s equity. 
Social  identity theory: a sense of belonging that dawns on an individual, especially when he 
finds himself in an environment where in which the people around him share same social 
groupings such as social status, social identity, cultural background, ethnical heritage, same age 
range or even same religion. 
Stakeholder: Individuals, groups, associations, businesses and system that can affect or are 
affected by an organization’s activities  
Stakeholder Theory: This theory alerts the firm on the need to satisfy the interest of every 
individual or community that has one thing or the other to do with the organization. The theory 
assumes that firms are meant to recognize the responsibility to all those who are affected by all 
of their operations. These individuals have a direct or indirect relationship with the firm, this 
means that they either can affect the firm or the firm can affect them 
Steward: An individual put in charge of a particular venture, business, undertaking and property, 
to represent the owner in management, maintenance. This individual is assumed to usually 
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makes proper and fair account to the owner for activities/occurrences (positive or negative) 
affecting such property transparently.  
Stewardship theory: An assumption that a steward protects and maximizes shareholders‟ 
wealth through firm performance, because, by so doing, the steward’s utility functions are 
maximized. 
Tobin’s Q: It is a statistic that might serve as a proxy for the firm's value from an investor's 
perspective. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the stock market valuation of firms to their "replacement" 
costs.  
Unit Root Test: a unit root test, tests whether a time series variable is non-stationary and 
possesses a unit root. The null hypothesis are generally defined as the presence of a unit root and 
the alternative hypothesis is either stationary, trend Stationarity or explosive root depending on 
the test used 
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter made a detailed elaboration on the review of prior studies related to the research. 
The chapter firstly explains corporate governance in a corporate firm. It elaborates on the new 
Nigerian corporate governance released in November, 2016. It also explains the concept of 
corporate board diversity and narrows down to ethnic diversity in Nigeria. Thirdly, this chapter 
lays out theoretical frameworks that support and can explain the research topic. Lastly, it uses a 
few empirical works to further illustrate the research topic with realistic events. 
In a modern corporate firm, a corporate board is established to mediate between the owners and 
the managers of a corporate firm. A corporate board is established to perform certain duties such 
as the provision of valuable resources and information to the organization, identification, and 
communication of stakeholder demands and opinions of the organization (Hun, 1998). The board 
is also responsible for the protection shareholders from management manipulation and favouring 
the interest of shareholders (Fame and Jensen, 1983). The corporate board assists in formulating, 
monitoring and improving the firm's corporate strategy. Given the corporate board importance as 
a valuable governing body in any corporate organization, many (like Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Anderson et al, 2011; Ferreira, 2010) have researched into the possible correlation between 
board effectiveness and board characteristics and it is seen that board characteristics have a way 
of influencing the effectiveness and performance of a board. This characteristic includes board 
diversity such as independence, ethnicity, experience, education, gender, and tenure. 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1.1 Corporate Governance 
The response to the problems arising from lack of effectiveness of the Board and a market leader 
in corporate performance began in England, America, and Canada. But after a short time, the 
scope of that environment was shaped by the private sector, expanded into the public sector 
(Baghani, Rivandy, and Saghiri, 2014). Corporate governance can be seen as ensuring that there 
is a continual increase in credibility, competence, transparency, communication and 
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accountability in other to ensure a firm is well guarded towards achieving the owner’s desired 
performance, aspirations and visions. It is also about how to build trust and sustain confidence 
among the various interest groups that make up an organization (Baghani, Rivandy, and Saghiri, 
2014). The outcome of a survey by Mckinsey in collaboration with the World Bank in June 2000 
attested to the strong link between corporate governance and stakeholder confidence (Mark, 
2000). The essence of corporate governance is for the defence of every shareholder and to 
encourage stakeholder's interest and awareness with the business activities of the firm.  
Corporate Governance seeks to promote fairness, transparency, and accountability in companies 
and with external mechanisms (including laws and regulations) and internal enterprise (mostly 
optional) can be applied to good management, reducing information asymmetry problems,  
increasing the confidence of shareholders and thereby reduce agency costs and causes best 
dividend policy. The term Governance implies rules, regulations, structures, processes, cultures 
and systems that achieve the goals of accountability, transparency, justice and the rights of 
beneficiaries. Generally, corporate governance is corporate control and guidance systems in one 
company. A system that determines controls and guides the relationship between the company 
and its stakeholders (Baghani, Rivandy, and Saghiri, 2014).  
2.1.2. Nigerian Corporate governance code and Board diversity 
The new National code of corporate governance 2016  which umbrellas (I)  all private companies 
that are holding or subsidiary, (II) all public companies (listed or not), (III) regulated private 
companies and (IV) all private companies with more than 8 employees that file returns to any 
regulatory authority other than the FIRS and CAC. This code comprises of the combination of 
several prior existing codes into one, and was put into effect on the 17th of October 2016. This 
new code brought innovation and raised standards to align with that of the UK code. The code 
for private sector introduced certain requirement that would foster and improve corporate 
governance, if applied and these requirements apply to, auditing, directors and even whistle 
blowing. 
 
The private sector code now requires that every prospective director should disclose his previous 
or current directorship status to the present and prospective company. This code stated that 
directors of a company to disclose membership of other boards and serving directors to disclose 
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prospective appointments to other boards (Templars, 2016). It also noted that family members 
nuclear or extended should not be members of the same board at the same time. The question is 
posed against Extended family as it has no definition (There are different distances to an 
extended family e.g. a long distance step cousin is not emotionally linked or blood related but 
she is an extended family). The code also went to a deeper extent in the measurement of 
independence when it comes to selection of independent and non-executive directors, which 
includes: not being a substantial shareholder, not being an employee of the company within the 
past five (5) years and not serving on the board for more than nine (9) years. All these policies 
are put in place in the bid to raise corporate governance quality/standard. 
 
This new code for private sector provided for a requirement to establish and disclose a summary 
on gender diversity for the board to assess annually, which makes a lot sense as research have 
push in the need for gender based diversity. In a nation like Nigeria, ethnic diversity is of key 
importance. The code emphasized on a minimum number of members on a board of directors as 
8, of which so many corporate firms have less than eight. Corporate governance mechanisms 
such as CEO duality, directors’ shareholdings, board size, board composition (inclusive of board 
diversity), executive compensation, quality audit committee, executive compensation and board 
independence have been found to relate to measures of earnings management and performance 
(Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau 2004; Tehranian, Cornett). Diversity could be a factor when 
assessing the performance of a firm. 
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Figure 2.0: The essential OECD corporate governance components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.0: Corporate governance (OECD) 
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regulators all over the world have been able to come up with country significant policies that 
would enhance governance in a nation. 
Regulators in UK and Nigeria have stated the importance of diversity in the governance of any 
organization. The importance of understanding the role of diversity is also recognized by 
regulators in this regards. In particular, the 2014 UK Corporate Governance Code articulates the 
importance of diversity: 
        One of the ways in which constructive debate can be encouraged is through having 
sufficient diversity on the board. This includes, but is not limited to, gender and race. 
Diverse board composition in these respects is not on its own a guarantee. Diversity is as 
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much about differences of approach and experience, and it is very important in ensuring 
effective engagement with key stakeholders and in order to deliver the business strategy 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2014, p. 2). 
 
Diversity in a board is a needed tool in ensuring solid corporate governance in a firm. The 
importance of diversity in board for proper governance is also backed up by the Nigerian code of 
corporate governance, which stipulates that the board should be composed in such a way as to 
ensure diversity of experience without compromising compatibility, integrity, availability, and 
independence (Obigbemi, Omolehinwa, Mukoro, Ben-Caleb, and Olusanmi, 2016). Also, the 
idea has been confirmed by the latest Nigerian code of corporate governance. The Nigerian 
steering committee released a recent Code of corporate governance in the Private sector, Public 
sector and Non for profit Organization in November 2016. The National code of corporate 
governance for private sector 2016 stated the importance of diversity in (Part B, 5.1:8) by 
stating: 
        The board shall be of a sufficient size relative to the scale and complexity of the company's 
operations and be composed in such a way as to ensure best practices and diversity of 
experience and gender without compromising competence, independence, integrity, and 
availability of members to attend and participate effectively in meetings, (The National 
code of corporate governance for private sector, 2016:8).    
We see the concept of diversity emphasized in these two regulations. Again, we see a similarity 
between the UK code and the Nigerian code in reference to gender diversity as the only 
referenced form of diversity. Below is an exploration into the nature of diversity in a board based 
on previous studies we shall be identifying the importance of other forms of diversity to a firm. 
2.1.3 Diversity 
The studies on diversity can be looked into in two different perspectives. These are demographic 
perspective and cognitive perspective. The demographic perspective can be viewed based on 
factors such as gender, age, race, ethnicity and so on while cognitive diversity are knowledge, 
education, values, perception, affection, experience, value personality characteristics and so on,  
Peterson, 2000; Timmerman, 2000, Omoye, Alade and Eriki (2013). From the above, we see that 
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the demographic perspective is viewed on characteristics that cannot necessarily be changed, 
they are default from the origin. The cognitive perspective is viewed based on certain 
characteristics that can be, imbibed, experienced, developed, and learned. These cognitive 
characteristics cannot be detected at first sight. They can only be detected in the individual 
through long-term observation and interrogation. Culture as a term has a very wide definition. 
Culture in central anthropology was seen to encompass all human phenomena that are not as a 
result of human genetics, Kulkarni (2012). It is a form of diversity that can also be seen from a 
cognitive and demographic perspective. The demographic aspect of culture deals with native 
attire, house design, art, type of food while the cognitive aspect deals with the language, lifestyle, 
way of greeting and so on.  
 
The major source of data for this study is the financial reports of the listed firm in the Nigerian 
stock exchange. The Culture of board member cannot necessarily be detected and measure easily 
from the corporate information in the financial reports of these listed firms. This is because the 
cognitive aspect of the culture of each board member cannot be detected from the corporate 
information. This is why this study has chosen to use ETHNIC DIVERSITY which is 
demographically inclined.  Ethnicity is based on claims or myths of common history, ancestry, 
language, race, religion, culture and territory (Edewo, Aluko and Folarin, 2014:17). Ethnic 
diversity was preferably used by previous researchers such as (Marimuthu, 2011; and Omoye, 
Alade, and Eriki, 2013). Ethnicity has a wider coverage over culture. The only pointer to the 
ethnicity of board members revealed in the financial report is the names of each board member. 
Kuper (1971) as cited by (Ojie and ewhrudjakpor, 2009) has “observed that the basic 
determinant of the structure of ethnically diverse societies is culture, with language as a key 
element” (Kuper, 1971). Names of board members are directly relatable to the language of their 
ethnic background. 
 
2.1.4 Board Diversity 
Diversity in a board can determine the level of innovation brought into an organization on one 
hand as a result of (creativity, diverse perspective, background and industrial experience) 
heterogeneous composition. On the other hand, a board can also be a principal source of 
disadvantage to a firm based on conflict and as a result of differences, intolerance, and 
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disagreements based on social identity theory predictions. For these reasons, the board is crucial 
in making certain key economic and financial course of actions. Diversity, though its benefits 
have relatively been under-examined in academic literature, is an important characteristic of any 
corporate board (Broome et al., 2011). The most emphasized view of board diversity have been 
the size of board as well as director independence (Coles et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2000; 
Dennis and Sarin, 1999).  
Board diversity has still been considered relevant subject in literature (van der Walt & Ingley 
2003; Kang et al. 2007) based on certain reasons such: provision of corporate board with new 
insights and perspective, thereby enhancing organizational performance and value (Coffey & 
Wang 1998; Carter et al., 2003);  for instance, studies of (Milliken & Martin, 1996), have shown 
that diversity of group membership can provoke member conversations of which ideas could be 
exchanged and improve performance. Diversity in a board could also offer a vast representation 
of diverse stakeholders of that firm and will represent the nature of the society which it is 
surrounded (van der Wailt & Ingley, 2003; Ayuso & Argandona, 2009).  
Owing to the benefits it provides for a firm, a number of studies have documented the 
advantages of a diverse board, examples are (Brammer et al., 2007; Arfken et al, 2004; Carter et 
al., 2003; van der Wailt & Ingley, 2003. Looking at Carter et al., 2003, it stated the positive 
effect of a diverse board on the marketplace, as it promotes understanding of the board, increases 
creativity, innovation and effective problem-solving. Furthermore, a board consisting of diverse 
members in gender, ethnicity or culture would most likely ask questions that would not be asked 
by those of the same background, thus increasing the independence of the board and 
effectiveness (Arfken et al., 2004). A diverse board would like to show greater and equal 
representation of the society, i.e. relevant and non-relevant stakeholders (van der Walt & Ingley, 
2003; Brammer et al., 2007) 
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Figure 2.1: Research variables 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Board 
diversity 
National diversity 
Ethnic diversity 
Financial performance 
(ROA, ROE & TOBIN’S Q 
Constant/Control 
variables 
1 Board size (used) 
2 Firm size 
Fig 2.0: Research variables showing the link between the independent, dependent variables 
and control variables 
2.1.4.1 Benefits and Challenges of Board Diversity 
Schumpeter referred to innovation as the key engine for growth of any business. Innovation has 
been a means by which firm is able to introduce products and processes that serve as new profit 
generating sectors thereby cutting cost. Therefore, innovation is a tool for keeping a business 
alive. Corporate boards are relevant and relate to innovation due to the fact that decision making 
in a team of directors is quality and results in creativity compared to that of individuals. 
Rockenbach et al., (2007), Blinder and Morgan (2005) found out that groups happen to make 
better investment decisions in environments that are characterized by risk taking and uncertainty 
than individual investors. A review of 25 year group decisions was reviewed by Kugler et al., 
(2012), dating from 1987-2012. The results were consistent with that of (Blinder and Morgan, 
2005). Innovation has its bedrock on social cohesion; it results from the process of interaction 
between people (Lundavall, 2002). Group diversity plays a great role in innovation, as proven 
empirically by (Ostergaard et al., 2011). Greater cultural and ethnic base will most time lead to 
higher levels of innovativeness amongst groups. Other studies that are in agreement with the 
positive influence diversity has on innovation and creativity are (Williams and O'Reilly, 1998; 
ver der Vegt and Janssen, 2003; Richard et al., 2004).  
Because major economic decisions are made at the corporate board level, we concentrate on how 
diverse boards contribute to innovation. To capture the quality of innovation, we use citations. 
We classify board diversity in the form of ascribing and achieved characteristics of directors. 
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Ascribed characteristics include gender, nationality, ethnicity, and age; and achieved 
characteristics include qualifications and experience. (Carter et al., 2007). Identified a number of 
arguments for diversity in board as related to the principal-agent framework. They concluded 
that a more diverse or heterogeneous board has the ability to take critical decisions when 
evaluating more alternatives compared to the decision making ability of an homogenous board. 
A diverse board, consisting of individuals from different background, and locations tend to have 
a better understanding of the firm’s market place which enhances the effectiveness of innovation 
and creativity knowing the desires of the market. A diverse board is easily equipped with ideas 
on batter ways to treat their customers since contribution is made from individuals of different 
background. This would enhance customer satisfaction, increasing the Goodwill or image of firm 
thereby positively affecting the customer behaviour towards the company and its products. 
Diversity dvocates in support of diversity in a corporate board, have explicitly argued that a 
diverse board will bring about improved financial, organization performance and capability to 
link up with global and domestic markets across the globe, expanded access to global and 
domestic talent pools, enhanced creativity and innovation, and strengthened social capital and 
cohesion (Kochen, et al. 2008). 
Despite the clear importance of board diversity, arguments against diversity of board still proves 
a course for more research for clarity. For instance, assuming boards that have diversity in board 
pave way for more suggestions and pool of contribution. This could also result in more critical 
evaluations of decision even when it is time bound and short termed which could lead to further 
time-consuming and ineffective activities. This will be a great hindrance to progress of firm 
especially if the firm operates in an environment that is highly competitive where proactivity in 
terms of reaction against market shocks is of great importance (Smith, Smith and Verner, 2005). 
Board diversity also could the cohesion in groups and could lead to a less corporative board and 
a board that experiences frictions and conflict. Such board squabbles may create an entirely new 
version of agency problems, thereby impeding firm performance. (Smith, Smith, and Verner, 
2005) equally, they argue that ethnically or gender diverse board would usually experience mor 
differences which could eventually improve the quality of decision making, of which may never 
offset negative effects of a slower decision-making process should the firm‘s marketplace 
demand quick responses. 
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The disadvantages of diversity are associated with the relationship or affective conflict (an 
awareness of interpersonal incompatibilities). Many studies have documented the detrimental 
effects of relationship conflict on group commitment and group decision quality, as it can lead to 
a reduced effort to resolve the group's cognitive tasks due to increased levels of stress and 
conflict within the group (e.g., De Wit et al., 2012; Jehn and Mannix, 2001). Culturally diverse 
groups, communication is slower, more difficult, more confused, and more frequently a source of 
misunderstanding. Differences in style and the attribution of meanings curtail conflict resolution 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Doney et al., 1998). As Kirchmeyer and Cohen (1992) point out, conflict 
in multicultural teams may be difficult to identify and even more difficult to resolve. 
Furthermore, Simons and Peterson (2000) show that an increase in task-related conflict goes 
hand in hand with an increase in relationship conflict, making it difficult to increase the benefits 
of diversity without increasing the disadvantages (for instance, people may interpret a discordant 
view as a personal attack or promotion of a hidden agenda). 
However, the resource dependency theory introduction to governance literature has widened its 
scope. The regular arguments of boardroom room diversity have been channelled towards the 
positive advantage in terms of innovations and economic gains. (Carter et al., 2003) was able to 
emphasize on the economic gain as well as the ethical consideration. The ethical point of view 
regards board diversity as desirable and that it is inappropriate to neglect certain groups (minor 
or major) from corporate elite based on diversities like gender, race, religions among others. In 
addition, board diversity represents the notion of equality of representation and fairness in 
society, empowering its constituents that have been excluded from power (Brammer et al., 
2007). 
2.1.5 Cultural diversity 
In the business field, effects cultural diversity has had various views and perspective. In the 
management literature, there has been a theoretical debate on cultural diversity as a "double-
edged sword" (Milliken and Martins, 1996). The double-edged sword tag is referring to the 
positive and negative sides of cultural diversity to a group. On one hand, cultural diversity 
enhances elaborate information, knowledge, diverse perspective, experience, and backgrounds 
(Nederveen Pieterse et al., 2013). Diversity in terms of foreign nationals in a multinational 
organization would always tend to ensure adequate representation of market base in their home 
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country (Maznevski, 1994).  Masulis et al. 2012) also demonstrated that firms with the foreign 
independent directors would find it easier to make an order across borders, especially when the 
targets are from their own country. In addition, cultural diversity can lead to lower levels of 
intragroup trust (Bjørnskov, 2008). 
One the other side cultural diversity could contribute to major frictions among members of a 
group. In cultural diversity, communication is slower, difficult and more confused, leading to 
misunderstanding among groups (Anderson et al., 2011). Cultural diversity could also reduce the 
trust level among group members (Bjornskov, 2008). The greater the degrees the more it’s 
difficult. Communication is slower, more confused, and more frequently a source of 
misunderstanding (Anderson et al., 2011; Doney et al., 1998). According to (Helena Cimerovaa, 
Olga Dodda, Bart Frijnsa, 2013) (which made use of Hofstede cultural distance as an instrument 
of cultural diversity) cultural diversity has a negative significant effect on the performance of 
firms. These negative aspects of cultural diversity can be linked to the findings of Ahern et al. 
(2015), who present strong evidence that cultural distance between an acquiring firm and its 
target reduces the likelihood of a successful acquisition.  
Cultural diversity in a board does not have a different effect from the effects we have explored in 
a typical group. On a board, cultural diversity has two major effects, according to the work of 
(Milliken and Martins, 1996) of which they are: through the degree of a related task and the 
relationship conflict it creates and through the impact it has on intragroup trust. The degree of 
task-related and relationship conflict represents the advantages and disadvantages of diversity 
that make up the two sides of cultural diversity (Milliken and Martins, 1996). The general 
advantages are referred to as task-related or cognitive conflict and relate to different (world) 
views, ideas, opinions, and different ways of perception and interpretation of information from 
the group (Nederveen Pieterse et al., 2013; Simons and Peterson, 2000). In this context, diversity 
influences, for example, group thinking. The notion that cultural diversity has both positive and 
negative consequences suggests that firms may be affected positively and negatively by cultural 
diversity. One of the negative or positive outcomes of cultural diversity in the board can directly 
be traced to the decision making as numerous studies have documented that culture affects 
financial decision making and financial outcomes (Helena Cimerovaa, Olga Dodda, Bart Frijnsa, 
2013). 
25 
 
2.1.5.1 Ethnic diversity 
Ethnic diversity in so many ways creates an avenue for the harvest of various ideas, perspectives 
and experiences which could serve as added advantage or could be detrimental. (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996) argued, in line with the detrimental effect of a small number of ethnic diversity, 
reasons resulting from the possible dissatisfaction of minority groups. They went on with the 
argument that the larger the diversity the more advantageous and could result in more innovative 
ability. Richard (2000) argued in the direction of racial diversity (an aspect of ethnic diversity). 
Emphasizing on its essence and importance in Richard (2003) by stating that racial diversity acts 
as a knowledge-based resource and empirically shows that racial diversity has a positive impact 
on the performance of innovative banks. Richard (2004) further went ahead to investigate the 
relationship between cultural diversity and performance of high-risk firms, of which the result 
showed a curvilinear relationship. The extant literature on the impact of racial and national 
cultural diversity on firm performance is mixed. We conjecture, because specifically innovation 
benefits from different points of views, its relationship with innovation should be positive. 
Cultural diversity can be viewed in various forms and from different angles. Some studies have 
viewed it from the national level (Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Ahern et al., 2012, among 
others) and others have viewed it from the cross country angle, i.e. Cross country difference in 
corporate practices (e.g Zheng, Ghoul, Guedhami, and Kwok., 2012; Bryan, Nash, and Patel., 
2014, among others). According to Helena Cimerovaa, Olga Dodda, Bart Frijnsa, 2013, prior 
studies on the impact of cultural differences have between groups. His work focused on impacts 
of cultural differences within groups, but this work combined both. The national diversity 
represents a culture between the groups (nationalities) and the ethnic diversity represent the 
culture within groups. 
2.1.5.2 Nature of the Nigerian Ethnic Diversity 
Nigeria like Canada, India, and Malaysia owe its existence to Great Britain, (Adetiba and Rahim, 
2012). The creation of Nigeria conglomerate formed the merge of diverse ethnic groups within a 
polity. Nigerian polity is one of the most ethnically diverse societies in the world, (Olayiwola, 
2016). Nigeria itself is a diverse entity with multi-ethnic, multilingual, multi-religious and 
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multicultural representations. Nigeria is said to have over 250 ethnic groups with 400 languages. 
Ogoanah (2012:147) as cited in (Ojo, 2016:2 
 
2.1.5.3 Ethnicity 
Nigeria has so many ethnic group with diverse cultural traditions and languages. In the Nigerian 
context, ethnicity as a social signifier is linked up with a particular sense of belonging as a result 
of a single common language, belief and origin, (Odiegwu, Ubabukoh, Baiyewu and Okpi, 
2012). In Nigeria, for instance, ethnic loyalties lead to conflicts when political allocations 
apparently do not favour a particular ethnic tribe or region (Odiegwu, Ubabukoh , Baiyewu and 
Okpi, 2012). These are in support of identity theory, which would be later addressed in this 
chapter.  The act of ethnicity discrimination in Nigeria, also known as tribalism, tends to promote 
frictions in various levels of institutions from the political scene down to the processes of 
forming the marital institution. If these is a strong factor to decision making at the top level 
(political level), how much more will it be a major factor that could influence the decision 
making of individual managing the affairs of a corporate firm. 
Figure 2.3: Social identities in Nigeria 
 
Dominant Social Identities in Nigeria (source: Loliya Akobo, 2016). 
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Diversity in terms of gender is still a strong topic of study in various organizations. Relating 
gender to the political scene there has been a relatable difference in a female leader of a male (in 
reference to contemporary leaders like the president of Brazil and most notable Margaret 
Thatcher). Relating ethnic diversity to the political scene we can also see that there have been 
drawbacks and obstacles to the overall political and economic development of Nigeria 
(Odeyemi, 2014). Though studies like that of (Omoye, Alade, and Eriki, 2013) and (Marimuthu, 
2011) have proven that ethnic diversity in, the board has a lot positive effect on firm 
performance, we can also hypothesize that ethnical diversity can also prove a great hindrance to 
the progress of a firm. 
2.1.5.4. Literature reviewed on Nigerian ethnic diversity 
Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu & Nwakoby, (2012), made use of panel data of 122 quoted firms in the 
Nigerian stock exchange regardless of industrial differences. Their results showed that national 
and ethnic diversity were positively linked to firms’ performance, which is not in agreement with 
this study. They focused on gender, ethnicity and nationality as board diversity using fixed effect 
generalized least square regression examining periods of 1991-2008 (17yrs) of which this period 
is pre-IFRS adoption periods. Omoye, Alade, & Eriki, (2013) made use of 96 randomly selected 
from the Nigerian stock exchange, using ordinary least square regression using the individual 
ethnic groups for separate analysis. Results showed that the individual ethnic group (Hausa, 
Igbo, and Yoruba) each had a negative association with firm performance. While Garba & 
Abubakar, (2014) investigated gender, ethnic diversity and board size. Selected 12 listed 
insurance firms, using data period of 2004-2009 which were analysed using feasible generalized 
least square regression and random effects estimators. Results showed a positive link between 
the foreign directors and firms’ performance, but ethnic diversity had no significant impact on 
firms’ performance, of which this is in agreement with this study. The above were the few 
Nigerian based studies that were reviewed by this study based on their method, data collection, 
period of analysis and findings. 
 
2.1.5.5 National Diversity 
Frijns et al., (2016) examine the role of national cultural diversity on corporate boards in 
determining firm outcomes. The authors find that national diversity has a negative relation with 
28 
 
Tobin's Q. However, the authors find that the negative relationship disappears for complex firms 
with significant exposure to international markets. Their findings are consistent with Masulis et 
al. (2012) who show a negative effect of foreign directors on firm performance. In contrast, 
Estelyiova and Nisar (2016) show that foreign directors on boards are associated with better 
performance. 
Gender diversity, being the center of attention, additional diversity variables (such as nationality, 
ethic, education, function, and age) is rarely investigated, (Omoye, Alade and Eritki, 2013). With 
regard to the international composition of the board (national diversity), the CG report by 
Heidrick and Struggles (2009) shows that in Europe the foreign percentage within boards has 
increased from 11 up to 23 percent within the years from 2007 to 2009. With regard to empirical 
CG research, it is expected that national diversity will gain importance due to the globalizing 
tendencies. However, there is an increasing number of empirical research studies for 
Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark), e.g. by Oxelheim and Randoy (2003), 
Randoy et al. (2006) and Rose (2007), measuring a positive influence of foreign board members 
on companies' performance. A positive link was also stated by Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu and 
Nwakoby, (2012) and Ujunwa (2012) for Nigerian quoted firms. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) 
observe only foreigners, who are originally from the US, Canada or England due to the planned 
adoption of the Anglo-American CG system. Randoy et al. (2006) use a different concept for the 
500 largest Danish, Norwegian and Swedish companies as the foreigners are not bound to 
specific regions. 
2.1.5.6 Literatures reviewed on Ethnic and National diversity 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2001), examined the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board 
membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin’s Q and ROE). 
The research was carried out in Norway & Sweden. Analysis of data was carried out using cross-
sectional ordinary least-square and two-stage least-square regression. Data from 132 firms are 
based in Norway and 121 firms in Sweden between the periods of 1996-1998.  Results showed a 
significant positive relationship between the presence of foreign directors on the board and 
firms’ financial performance. (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003) examined the relationship 
between firm performance and board diversity. The board diversity variables used in this study 
were percentage representatives of women, African American, Asians and Hispanics on the 
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board of fortune 1000 firms, controlling for size industry and other corporate governance 
measures. This research was relevant as at 2003 because it represented the first empirical 
evidence to show if board diversity could bring about improve financial performance. The results 
showed a significant positive relationship between women and ethnic minorities on board with 
firm performance.  
Swartz and Firer (2005), examined the effects of ethnic and gender diversity on firm 
performance in South Africa. Focusing on 117 listed companies on the JSE. Data were analysed 
using cross‐sectional multiple regressions. Financial parameters like ROE were found to have a 
significant positive relationship between ethnic diversity and firms’ performance.  Nishiiet al. 
(2007), determined the effects of demographic diversity on firm performance in the U.S.A. Data 
analysed were 260 U.S. firms using the survey method. Financial performance parameters used 
are ROA, ROE Found significant positive relationship between ethnic diversity and firms’ 
performance. Marimuthu (2008), Determine the effects of ethnic and gender  diversity on firm 
performance in Malaysia. He made use of Sample of 100 non-financial companies, data obtained 
from 2000 to 2005. The analysis used to study was Weighted Least Squares & ordinary least 
squares. Financial measures are ROE, ROA found a significant positive relationship between 
ethnic diversity and firms’ performance. Lehman & Dufrene (2008) determined the relationship 
between board cross-cultural diversity and performance. This Empirical study made use of ROE 
as a measure of financial performance for measuring the effects of ethnic diversity in board with 
one hand, a diverse board in terms of culture may cause cross-cultural communication problems 
and interpersonal conflicts. Zainal- Abidin, Kamal & Jusoff (2009) looked at Board 
Composition, Directors’ Ownership, CEO Duality, Board Size  and their effects On performance 
of firms using data from 75 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. Analysed data using Content 
analysis and ROA as the financial measure. Findings reveal that ROA has an inverse relationship 
with National diversity. 
Adams and Ferreira (2010) examined the relationship between board diversity and firm 
performance. ROA, ROE, Other instruments were used as the financial performance 
measurement instruments. Empirical findings indicate that diversity results in greater 
Knowledge, creativity and innovation and thus, organizations tend to become more competitive. 
Carter, D’souza, Simkins, & (2010) determine the effects of the inclusion of women and ethnic 
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minority on firm performance in the U.S.A. Data were collected from the total composition of 
Fortune 500 board committees between 1998 and 2002, 5yrs. Analysed using OLS regression 
with Tobin’s Q and ROE as the financial measure. Findings show that ethnic and Gender 
diversity may have a positive or negative effect on performance. Ararat, Aksu and Cetin (2010) 
aimed to determine the relationship between board  diversity and performance using variables 
like Gender, Ethnic, Educational and Nationality background in Turkey. He made use of Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of financial performance in the empirical study. Results found that higher 
diversity leads to an increase in market-to-book ratio of a firm in such countries as Turkey. 
(Darmadi, 2011) aimed to determine the relationship between board  diversity and performance 
in Indonesia.  He made use of gender, nationality, age, and ROE as diversity and financial 
performance variables respectively. The results showed that nationality diversity has no impact 
on the financial performance for a sample of Indonesian companies.  Schwizer et al. (2012) 
determined the relationship between the presence foreign directors in board and performance. 
Primary and secondary data were collected from U.S. Firms using ROE as financial measure. 
The study Found that a significant negative relationship exists between foreign directors, board 
inclusion and performance. Zainal, Zulkifli, and  Saleh, (2013) determined the relationship 
between board  diversity and performance, making use of Women and foreign directors as 
variables in Malaysia. Data were collected from top 300 Malaysian firms of periods 2005 to 
2009 Using longitudinal descriptive analysis of the trend of board diversity. Mann-Whitney U 
test to find similarities and differences. Findings show that Financial performance (ROA) has a 
negative relationship with the presence of Women and foreign directors.  
(Giannetti and Zhao, 2014) investigated  the effect of board diversity using racial diversity on 
firm performance volatility, looking at listed firms in the USA. The study proved that as the level 
of diversity increasing the performance of the firm also increases. (Rhode and Packel, 2014), 
provided a comprehensive overview of recent studies on board diversity and firm performance. 
They examined on whether diversity as been proven as a means of improving firm performance, 
board decision making, governance and firm reputation. They examined the strengths and 
weakness of various methodological approach and survey findings. Their results indicated that 
the relationship between diversity and firm performance has not yet been convincingly 
established. Cimerovaa, doda, & Frijnsa, 2014), examined the impact of cultural diversity on 
firm performance amongst U.K. firms. Analysis was done using Two stage least square 
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regression and data was gotten from 244 firms from the periods 2002-2012 using Tobin’s Q and 
ROA for financial measure. Findings indicate that cultural diversity on boards negatively affects 
firm performance. (Miller and Triana, 2014)  investigated the mediators that can explain how 
corporate board diversity is related to firm performance, using data from fortune 500 firms 
between periods 2002 to 2005. The findings show a positive relationship between innovation, 
board racial diversity and firm reputation. Findings also indicated that firm reputation and 
innovation are mediators between board racial diversity and firm performance. Protasovs, (2015) 
examined  the relationship between board  diversity and financial performance using Ethnic, 
ages, education  and gender diversity as diversity variables in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia & 
Singapore. 100 companies were examined within the South-East Asian region financial 
performance data (ROA & ROE) for the five-year interval from 2009 to 2013. The results show 
there was no significant relationship between ethnic diversity and firm financial performance. 
Sharma, (2016) determines the effects of board  diversity on firm performance in the U.S.A., 
using gender, ethnicity, nationality, age; education and experience. Analysis was done using 
OLS regression. Data from 2000 to 2006, 5432 unique U.S. firms of which 1216 applied with 
ROA as the financial performance measure used. Results showed that Ethnicity and nationality 
had a positive impact on innovation and age dissimilarity and lack of women has a negative 
impact. (Frijns, Dodd & Cimerova 2016) determine the effects of cultural  diversity on firm 
performance in U.K. and analysed data 243 firms from 2002-2014 using fixed effects and 
instrumental variables regressions and ROA & Tobin’s Q as financial performance parameters. 
Results prove that national cultural diversity on boards negatively affects firm performance. 
(Bernile, Bhagwat and Yonker, 2016), examined the impact of director diversity on corporate 
policies and risk making use of multi-dimensional diversity index. The results showed that board 
diversity leads to significant reduction in the return volatility due to the adoption of less risky 
financial policies by diverse boards. The results also proved that firms with a higher board 
diversity tent to invest resources more in firm improving activities like R&D and produce more 
and better innovation. Though produces friction among board members board diversity 
performance benefits outweighs cost. 
2.1.6 Firm performance 
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 Company performance is concerned with the whole health status of the company financial or 
otherwise. Traditionally, the analysis of the performance of a firm is usually a bench on financial 
performance indicators, but nowadays there is a broader view to its evaluation by the inclusion of 
non-financial performance indicators such as corporate social responsibility, organizational 
reputation, innovation/technology, employee morale and research and development. This 
research would only take financial performance into consideration. (Santoss, Ledur & brito, 
2012), in their work classified modern firm performance into strategic performance and financial 
performance. The strategic performance was classified into customer satisfaction, employee 
satisfaction, social responsibility and environmental responsibility. While financial performance 
were classified as profitability, growth and market value as shown in the figure below. 
Figure 2.4: Second-order models of firm performance 
 
 
Source: (Santos, Ledur & brito, 2012) 
 
 
 
Table 2.0  Financial performance Indicators 
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The study is particularly concerned with the financial performance of the firm. It makes use of 
the profitability measures above.  
The table below is a review concerned with the available literature that measured the effect of 
ethnic diversity on firm performance, showing the financial measure implemented, location, the 
difference in this study (identified gaps) and the findings. 
Table 2.1: Summary of the literature reviewed 
S/
N 
 
Autho
r 
Objective & Area 
of study 
Location Methodology Findings & Shortcomings 
S/N Indicators  
1 Profitability Return on Assets, EBITDA margin, Return on investment, Net 
income/Revenues, Return on equity, Economic value added 
 
2 Market Value               Earnings per share, Stock price improvement, Dividend yield, Stock price 
volatility, Market value added (market value/equity), Tobin's q (market 
value/replacement value of assets) 
3 Growth Market-share growth, Asset growth, Net revenue growth, Net income 
growth, Number of employees growth 
 
4 Employee 
Satisfaction        
Turn-over, Investments in employees development and training Wages 
and rewards policies, Career plans, Organizational climate, General 
employees’ satisfaction 
 
5 Customer 
Satisfaction        
Mix of products and services, Number of complaints, Repurchase rate, 
customer retention, General customers’ satisfaction, Number of new 
products/services launched 
 
6 Environmental 
Performance           
Number of projects to improve/recover the environment, Level of 
pollutants emission, Use of recyclable materials, Recycling level and 
reuse of residuals, Number of environmental lawsuits 
 
7 Social 
Performance      
 
Employment of minorities, Number of social and cultural projects, 
Number of lawsuits filed by employees, customers and regulatory 
agencies 
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1 Garba 
& 
Abuba
kar, 
2014 
To investigate the 
relationship between 
board diversity and 
financial 
performance of 
insurance companies 
in Nigeria.  
Studied gender, 
ethnic, board size, 
board composition 
and foreign 
directorship 
 
Nigeria Analysed 12 listed 
insurance firms, using 
data period of 2004-2009 
Analysed using feasible 
generalized least square 
regression and random 
effect estimators. ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q 
Findings indicate a positive 
and significant relationship 
between National diversity  
and performance. Ethnic 
diversity has no significant 
influence on performance. 
Only focused on 12 
insurance companies. Data 
ranged from 2004-2009. 
Used FGLS regression. 
2 Frijns, 
Dodd 
& 
Cimer
ova 
2016), 
Determine the 
effects of cultural  
diversity on firm 
performance 
 
National cultural 
diversity 
U.K.  Analysed data 243 firms 
from 2002-2014 using 
fixed effects and 
instrumental variables 
regressions. ROA & 
Tobin’s Q 
National cultural diversity in 
boards negatively affects firm 
performance. Did not make 
use of Tobin’s Q. Focus only 
on ethnic diversity 
 
3 Swartz 
and 
Firer 
(2005)
, 
Examine the effects 
of ethnic and gender  
diversity on firm 
performance 
 
Gender and Ethnic 
diversity 
South 
Africa 
Focused on 117   listed 
companies on JSE. 
Analysed using 
cross‐sectional multiple 
regressions. ROE 
Found significant positive 
relationship between ethnic 
diversity and firms’ 
performance. Did not make 
use of Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Focus only on ethnic 
diversity 
 
4 Nishii
et 
al.(200
7),  
Determine the 
effects of 
demographic 
diversity on firm 
performance 
 
Demographic 
diversity 
U.S.A Analysed 260 U.S. firms 
using the ssurvey 
method. Financial 
performance parameters 
used are ROA, ROE 
Found significant positive 
relationship between ethnic 
diversity and firms’ 
performance. Did not make 
use of Tobin’s Q. Focus only 
on ethnic diversity 
 
5 Marim
uthu 
(2008)
,  
Determine the 
effects of ethnic and 
gender  diversity on 
firm performance 
 
Ethnic & Gender 
diversity 
Malaysia Sample of 100 non-
financial companies, data 
obtained from 2000 to 
2005. Analysis used for 
study was Weighted 
Least Squares & ordinary 
least squares. Financial 
measures are ROE, ROA 
Found significant positive 
relationship between ethnic 
diversity and firms’ 
performance. Did not make 
use of Tobin’s Q. No 
national diversity. Not 
Nigerian based. 
 
6 Marim
uthu 
Determine the 
effects of ethnic and 
Malaysia Sample of 100 non-
financial companies, data 
Found no significant 
relationship between ethnic 
35 
 
and 
Kolad
aisamy
(2009a
) 
gender  diversity on 
firm performance  
 
Ethnic & Gender 
diversity 
obtained from 2000 to 
2006. Analysis used for 
study was a series of 
OLS regressions using on 
the cross-sectional data. 
Financial measures are 
ROE, ROA  
  
diversity on the board and 
firm performance. Did not 
make use of Tobin’s Q. No 
national diversity. Not 
Nigerian based. 
 
7 Sharm
a, 
(2016) 
Determine the 
effects of board  
diversity on firm 
performance 
 
Gender, ethnicity, 
nationality, age; 
education and 
experience 
U.S.A. Analysed using OLS 
regression. Data from 
2000 to 2006, 5432 
unique U.S. firms of 
which 1216 applied for a 
spa tent. ROA as the 
financial performance 
measure used. 
Ethnicity and nationality mix 
has a positive impact on 
innovation and age 
dissimilarity and lack of 
women has a negative impact. 
Did not make use of Tobin’s 
Q & ROE. Not Nigerian 
based.  
8 Oxelh
eim 
and 
Rando
y 
(2001)
,  
To examine the 
effect of foreign 
(Anglo-American) 
board membership 
on corporate 
Performance 
measured in terms of 
firm value (Tobin’s 
Q).  
Foreign directors 
Norway 
& 
Sweden 
Analysed data using 
cross-sectional ordinary 
least-square and two-
stage least-square 
regression. Data from 
firms. 132 are based in 
Norway and 121 in 
Sweden 1996-1998.  
Used ROE as financial 
measure 
Found a significant positive 
relationship between the 
presence of foreign directors 
on the board and firms’ 
financial performance. Did 
not make use of Tobin’s Q. 
No national diversity 
 
9 Torny
eva 
and 
Werek
o 
(2012) 
Communication 
policy and 
performance 
evaluation aspect of 
soft corporate 
governance 
Ghana 19 Ghanian companies. 
Panel data methodology 
for the regression 
analysis. Data collected 
combined primary and 
secondary data from 
2005 – 2009. Financial 
measures are (ROA) & 
(ROE)  
Communication policy and 
performance evaluation have 
statistically significant 
positive relationship with the 
performance. Did not make 
use of Tobin’s Q.  Did not 
even focus on diversity.  Not 
Nigerian based. 
 
10 Schwi
zer et 
al.(201
2) 
 
To determine the 
relationship between 
the presence foreign 
directors in board 
and performance 
 
Foreign directors 
N/A Data collected combined 
primary and secondary 
data US. Firms using 
ROE as financial 
measure. 
Found a significant negative 
relationship between the 
variables. Did not make use 
of Tobin’s Q and ROA. No 
Ethnic diversity 
 
11 Zainal, 
Zulkifl
i, and  
To determine the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
Malaysia Data collected from top 
300 Malaysian firms of 
periods 2005 to 2009. 
Financial performance (ROA) 
has a negative relationship 
with the presence of Women 
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Saleh, 
(2013)
. 
performance 
 
Women and 
foreign directors 
Used longitudinal 
descriptive analysis of 
the trend of board 
diversity is presented. 
Mann-Whitney U test to 
find similarities and 
differences 
and foreign directors. Did not 
make use of Tobin’s Q and 
ROE. No Ethnic. Not 
Nigerian based. 
12 Omoy
e, 
Alade, 
&Eriki
, 2013 
Examines board 
ethnic diversity  and 
firm performance in 
Nigeria. 
 
Ethnic diversity 
Nigeria Analysed 96 randomly 
selected firms. Using 
ordinary least square 
regression. ROA 
Found negative relationship 
between ethnic diversity on 
the board and firm 
performance. Did not 
separate financial and non-
financial firms. Used only 
ROA 
 
13 Protas
ovs, 
(2015) 
To determine the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
financial 
performance 
 
Ethnic, ages, 
education  and 
gender diversity 
Indonesi, 
Thailand, 
Malaysia 
& 
Singapor
e 
100 companies within the 
South-East Asian region 
financial performance 
data (ROA & ROE ) for 
the five-year interval 
from 2009 to 2013 
There was no significant 
relationship between ethnic 
diversity and firm financial 
performance. Did not make 
use of Tobin’s Q. No 
National diversity. Not 
Nigerian based. 
14 Darma
di, 
2011 
To determine the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
performance in 
Indonesia 
 
Gender, 
nationality, and age 
Indonesia Data were collected from 
top 300 Malaysian firms 
of periods 2005 to 2009 
Using longitudinal 
descriptive analysis of 
the trend of board 
diversity. Mann-Whitney 
U test to find similarities 
and differences. ROE as 
financial measure  
Found that nationality 
diversity has no impact on the 
financial performance for a 
sample of Indonesian 
companies. Did not make use 
of Tobin’s Q and ROA. No 
Ethnic diversity.Not 
Nigerian based.based. 
15 Ararat, 
Aksu 
and 
Cetin 
(2010) 
To determine the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
performance in 
Turkey. 
 
Gender, Ethnic, 
Educational and 
Nationality 
background 
Turkey Made use of Tobin’s Q 
as a measure of financial 
performance in the 
empirical study. 
Found that higher diversity 
leads to an increase in market-
to-book ratio of a firm in such 
countries as Turkey. Did not 
make use of ROA and ROE. 
Not Nigerian based. 
16 Lehma
n & 
To determine the 
relationship between 
N/A This Empirical study 
made use of ROE as a 
On the one hand, a diverse 
board in terms of culture may 
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Dufren
e 
(2008) 
board cross-cultural 
diversity and 
performance 
 
Ethnic diversity 
measure of financial 
performance for 
measuring the effects of 
ethnic diversity in board  
cause cross-cultural 
communication problems and 
interpersonal conflicts. Did 
not make use of Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. No national 
diversity. 
17 Oxelh
eim & 
Rando
y 
(2003) 
To examine the 
effect of foreign 
(Anglo-American) 
board membership 
on corporate 
Performance 
measured in terms of 
firm value (Tobin’s 
Q).  
Foreign directors 
Norwegia
n and 
Swedish 
firms 
Analysed data using 
cross-sectional ordinary 
least-square and two-
stage least-square 
regression. Data from 
firms. 132 are based in 
Norway and 121 in 
Sweden 1996-1998.  
A board which has foreign 
representatives creates 
potential benefits for the 
company. Did not make use 
of ROA and ROE. No 
Ethnic diversity.Not 
Nigerian based. 
18 Ruigro
k & 
Kaczm
arek 
(2008)  
To determine the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
performance 
 
 
 
Foreign directors 
UK, 
Dutch 
and 
Swiss 
firms. 
Used ROE as financial 
measure 
Found results that board 
which has foreign 
representatives creates 
potential benefits for the 
company. Using net income 
as a performance measure. 
Did not make use of Tobin’s 
Q, ROA and ROE. No 
Ethnic diversity.Not 
Nigerian based.  
19 Adams 
and 
Ferreir
a 
(2007) 
& 
(2010) 
 
Examines the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
firm performance 
 
 
Board Diversity  
General ROA, ROE, Other 
instruments were used as 
the financial performance 
measurement instruments  
. 
Empirical findings indicate 
that diversity results in greater 
Knowledge, creativity and 
innovation and thus, 
organizations tend to become 
more competitive. Was 
amongst the forunners in 
prior literature, so results 
are a based on data from the 
last decade and are not 
recent. 
20 Erhard
t, 
Werbe
l, & 
Shrade
r, 
(2003)
, 
Determining the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
performance in the 
U.S. 
 
Gender, race & 
ethnicity 
USA Looked at 112 leading 
firms over five (5) years  
Made use of ROE as 
financial performance 
measure 
Positive relationship between 
performance of those firms 
and their board diversity. Did 
not make use of Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. No National 
diversity. Not Nigerian 
based. 
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21 Cimer
ovaa, 
doda, 
& 
Frijnsa
, 
2014), 
To determine the 
impact of cultural 
diversity on firm 
performance.   
 
Cultural diversity 
UK Analysis was done using 
Two stage least square 
regression. Data was 
gotten from 244 firms 
from 2002-2012 Tobin’s 
Q and ROA 
Findings indicate that cultural 
diversity on boards negatively 
affects firm performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Only used Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. Not Nigerian 
based. 
22 Ujunw
a, 
Okoye
uzu 
and 
Nwak
oby, 
(2012) 
Determine the 
relationship between 
board  diversity and 
performance 
 
 
Ethnic, National 
and Gender 
Diversity. 
Nigeria Collated and analysed 
panel data of 122 quoted 
firms using fixed effect 
generalized least square 
regression. Data from 
1991-2008 (17yrs). ROA 
as the financial measure 
Gender diversity, nationality 
and ethnicity were negatively, 
positively and  positively 
linked to firm performance,  
respectively. Data dated 
from 1991-2008 (pre-IFRS). 
Did not separate financial 
and nonfinancial firms. 
Used FEGLS regression 
23 Carter, 
D’sou
za, 
Simki
ns, & 
(Simps
on, 
2007) 
Determine the 
effects of  racial and 
gender  diversity on 
firm performance 
 
Racial and Gender 
U.K. Data collected from the 
total composition of 
Fortune 500 board 
committees between 
1998 and 2002, 5yrs. 
ROE as the financial 
measure 
They found a positive 
Effect of Racial and Gender 
diversity on performance. Did 
not make use of Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. No Ethnic and 
National diversity. Not 
Nigerian based. 
24 Zainal
- 
Abidin
, 
Kamal 
& 
Jusoff 
(2009) 
Board Composition, 
Directors’ 
Ownership, CEO 
Duality, Board Size  
and their effects 
On performance of 
firms 
Malaysia Data from 75 companies 
listed on Bursa Malaysia.  
Analysed data using 
Content analysis and 
ROA as the financial 
measure 
ROA has an inverse 
relationship with National 
diversity. Did not make use 
of Tobin’s Q and ROE. No 
Ethnic and National 
diversity. Not Nigerian 
based. 
25 Carter, 
D’sou
za, 
Simki
ns, & 
(Simps
on, 
2010) 
Determine the 
effects of the 
inclusion of women 
and ethnic minority 
on firm performance 
 
Racial and Gender 
U.S.A. Data collected from the 
total composition of 
Fortune 500 board 
committees between 
1998 and 2002, 5yrs. 
Analysed using OLS 
regression. Tobin’s Q 
and ROE as the financial 
measure 
They found  that ethnic and 
Gender diversity may have a 
positive or negative effect on 
performance. Did not make 
use of ROA. No Ethnic and 
National diversity. Not 
Nigerian based. 
26 (Miller 
&Tria
na, 
2014)   
investigated the 
mediators that can 
explain how 
corporate board 
U.K. Analysed data from 
fortune 500 firms 
between periods 2002 to 
2005. 
Findings show a positive 
relationship between 
innovation, board racial 
diversity and firm reputation. 
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diversity is related to 
firm performance 
Findings also indicated that 
firm reputation and 
innovation are mediators 
between board racial diversity 
and firm performance. 
 
2.1.6.1 Measurement of Financial performance 
The financial framework is the old paradigm for performance evaluation. Its roots are in the 
areas of accounting, financial management, and economics (Marie, Ibrahim and Nasser, 2014). 
Over the years, the accounting literature, for example, has recognized the importance of cost 
control, profitability, and liquidity. Financial and accounting reports employ various measures 
for profitability (Marie et al., 2014). Consequently, performance evaluation systems have seen 
two new profitability measures: percentage of gross profit and the rate of return on investment. 
However, several authors (e.g., Kaplan & Norton, 2001; Ibrahim, 1999) indicated that although 
financial measures are important, they are not enough for a good performance evaluation system. 
The system should also incorporate non-financial measures of performance. One rationale for 
this trend is provided by (Kelly, 2007). He indicated that firm value is created through different 
activities that promote critical success factors. These factors include innovation, quality, 
productivity, and customer satisfaction. Also, Gu (2005) pointed out that these success factors 
ultimately improve future financial performance. Current summary financial measures that report 
financial results, such as operating income and return on investment, are unlikely to fully reflect 
the long-term consequences of these activities. Hence, many firms complement summary 
financial measures with nonfinancial measures that reflect key value-creating activities (Kaplan 
& Norton, 2001). However, Ittner and Larcker (2001) indicated that there is a lack of evidence of 
when and how nonfinancial measures improve managerial performance. Firm performance can 
be looked at from different directions and perspectives. This study decided to focus on the 
financial aspect of performance. Financial performance itself can be viewed and assessed 
differently, including liquidity and turnover which measures the ability of firms to catch up with 
expected financial obligations that are due and this must be done without interruption of day to 
day operations of the business (Kamukama, 2011; Abdelmohsen et al., 2013; Tumwine et al., 
2015). Financial performance can also be seen from the eye of profitability. This dimension of 
financial performance deals with the extent to which a firm generates profit from the factors of 
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production such as labour, management and capital (Kreusel & Christian, 2008; Hofmann & 
Lampe, 2013). In this study, profitability will be measured in terms of ROA, ROE and TOBIN'S 
Q 
Some useful measures of financial performance, which is the alternative term as financial 
soundness, are coined into what is referred to as CAMEL (Roger, 2008). The acronym 
"CAMEL" refers to the five components of a bank's condition that are assessed: Capital 
adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. Each of this gives birth to the 
indicators of financial performance when it comes to the measurement of financial performance. 
Capital Adequacy: This ultimately determines how well financial institutions can cope with 
shocks to their balance sheets. The firm monitors the adequacy of its capital using ratios. Capital 
adequacy is measured in relation to the relative risk weights assigned to the different category of 
assets held both on and off the balance sheet items (Roger, 2008).  
Asset Quality: The quality of assets in terms of overexposure to specific risks-trends in non-
performing loans, and the health and profitability of firms. Ultimately, this negatively impacts on 
the profitability and capital through extra specific provisions for bad debts (Roger, 2008). 
Earnings: The continued viability of a firm depends on its ability to earn an adequate return on A 
number of authors have argued that, firms that must survive need: Higher Return on Assets 
(ROA)., better return on net worth/Equity (ROE), sound capital base, i.e. the Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAR), adoption of corporate governance ensuring transparency to stakeholders that is 
equity holders, regulators and the public. 
Liquidity: Initially solvent financial institutions may be driven toward closure by poor 
management of short-term liquidity. Indicators should cover funding sources and capture large 
maturity mismatches.  
2.1.6.1.1 The Tobin Q 
The Tobin q has been employed, particularly by manufacturing firms to explain a number of 
diverse corporate phenomena. These have entailed (a) cross-sectional differences in investment 
and diversification decisions, (b) the relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm 
value, (c) the relationship between managerial performance and tender offer gains, investment 
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opportunities and tender offer responses, and (d) financing, dividend, and compensating policies 
(Chung and Pruitt, 1994). It is a statistic that might serve as a proxy for the firm's value from an 
investor's perspective. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the stock market valuation of firms to their 
"replacement" costs.  
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section of the study is written with the aim of using relevant and recognized theories as a 
bedrock foundation to explain the study. Several theories can be used to explain the phenomena 
of diversity in board its effects. This study has chosen to lay hold of five theories that could help 
explain corporate board ethnic and national diversity and their effects the financial performance 
of a firm. The theories are outlined: Agency theory, Stewardship theory, Social identity theory, 
and Resource dependence theory 
2.2.1 Agency vs. Stewardship Theory 
The Agency theory serves as an appropriate approach for board diversity and its effects on 
business performance in one-tier and two-tier systems (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The board of directors or the management board and supervisory board within 
listed public companies represent the agents of the shareholders (principals) because they adopt 
and execute business management and monitoring on behalf of the shareholders (Yermack, 
1996; Daily et al., 2003). The major problems of the agency theory are information asymmetries 
due to hidden characteristics, hidden information, hidden action and hidden transfer. Therefore, 
the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard increase (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, conflicts of interests between the corporate administration and the capital market 
rise. The corporate administration ideally operates in the investors' interests by considering the 
shareholder value-policy. Through monitoring and bonding, which also causes agency costs, 
hidden actions are supposed to be reduced. 
Contrary to the agency theory the stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 
1991) neglects the assumption that board members act opportunistically. Therefore, the board 
members are supposed to operate in terms of shareholders and the capital market, whereas a 
trade-off between personal needs and corporate objectives takes place. In order to ensure the 
stewards' self-motivation, specific monitoring activities are counterproductive. This is based on 
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the assumption that the management board's activities correspond with the interests of the 
shareholder meeting. Furthermore, the management board is aiming to reduce possible 
information asymmetries. The supervisory board rather functions as a supporting and consulting 
instance, which creates and expands the optimal framework for the management (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Ong & Lee, 2000). 
2.2.1.1 Principal-Agent Problem 
The owners of a business have the right to direct the business to the direction they desire.  Most 
large firms require the appointment of good and competent hands capable of handling certain 
managerial duties. When a manager is employed he is expected to act in line with the ideas of the 
owners, though given a level of freedom to make a certain decision based on his expertise.  
Agency theory emphasizes on the relationship between the owner and the agent where both 
parties have contrasting goal and interests. It describes the relationship using the metaphor of 
contract (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) A situation where the managers choose to act in line with 
his own personal ideas and withhold certain critical information that is material to the business 
by the owners, has become a principal-agency problem. One of the major factors that facilitate 
conflict of interest between owners and agents is information asymmetry, with the agent being in 
a position where he has more access to key information for effective decision making.  
In a way to tackle agency problem the principal chooses to devise a monitoring system that 
would be useful in mitigation of agency behaviours, and putting a check performance (Fama, 
1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the degree of information asymmetry between 
principal and agent decides the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanism. This theory has 
stimulated several governance types of research and the adoption of various corporate 
governance principles and codes in several countries. The common denominator of all these 
codes and principles is their emphasis on the importance of an independent board as a strategy 
for resolving this conflict of interest between principal and agents. 
2.2.1.2 Corporate Governance and Stewardship Theory 
In a modern corporate firm, a corporate board is established to mediate between the owners and 
the managers of a corporate firm. A corporate board is an established to perform certain duties 
such as the provision of valuable resources and information to the organization, identification, 
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and communication of stakeholder demands and opinions of the organization (Hun, 1998). The 
board is also responsible for the protection shareholders from management manipulation and 
favouring the interest of shareholders (Fame and Jensen, 1983). The corporate board assists in 
formulating, monitoring and improving the firm's corporate strategy. 
Stakeholder theory 
This theory alerts the firm on the need to satisfy the interest of every individual or community 
that has one thing or the other to do with the organization. (Freeman, 1984) as cited in (Richard, 
Muhsin, Mutahyoba and Laura, 2016) the theory assumes that firms are meant to recognize the 
responsibility to all those who are affected by all of their operations. These individuals have a 
direct or indirect relationship with the firm, this means that they either can affect the firm or the 
firm can affect them (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004)   
The stakeholders from the explanation of freeman can be the surrounding society which could be 
affected by operations. Amongst the stakeholders there are certain important stakeholders that 
are referred to as ‘key stakeholders’, these stakeholders could be shareholder, investors, 
regulators, important customer, suppliers, creditors and the likes. 
2.2.2 Social Identity Theory 
There is a sense of belonging that dawns on an individual, especially when he finds himself in an 
environment where in which the people around him share same social groupings such as social 
status, social identity, cultural background, ethnical heritage, same age range or even same 
religion. (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) claimed that certain groups categories of which individuals 
belong to, such as social class, family, and a football team and so on were an important source of 
self-esteem and pride for individuals. For instance, a person sees themselves as belonging to a 
specific group (in-group). Other comparable or alike group that the individual does not identify 
with is regarded as out-group which is more like an "us" versus "them" mentality, (Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). Social identity theory suggests that people are drawn to one another when they 
have shared similarities mixed gender and racial groups may cause division and diversity may 
elicit group conflict that interferes with efficacy (Omoye, Alade and Eriki, 2013). 
2.2.3. Resource Dependence Theory 
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The resource dependency theory provides a theoretical basis to explain this association between 
board diversity and firm financial performance, since the theory states that ‘board members with 
different skills, different cultural backgrounds, different gender, among others, will act as a 
strategic resource to the firm which may result to superior performance' (Ujunwa et al., 2012). 
The resource-dependence theory developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) focuses on the mutual 
interaction between organizations in order to support the exchange of resources. The long-term 
prosperity of companies depends on the availability and the controlling possibilities regarding 
critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Thereby, the members of the corporate 
administration, who distinguish in terms of age, gender, nationality or education, are able to 
concentrate the diverging resources for the benefit of the company (Hillman et al., 2000). 
Hereafter, a higher effectiveness of board activities can be justified, for example, due to higher 
information processing or the necessity to discuss within the plenum (Carter et al., 2010). Due to 
the members' different individual contacts inside and outside the company, a variety of 
additional resources are generated by a growing board-size. 
2.3 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Since the aftermath of recent scandals such as WorldCom, Tyco International (USA), HIH 
insurance (Australia), Parmalat (Italy), major practitioners have called for a more diverse board 
which would help mitigate against weak corporate governance. 
On the empirical front, results from studies in different jurisdictions are mixed and inconclusive. 
Carter et al. (2007) examined the impact of board gender and ethnic diversity on the financial 
performance of all firms listed on the Fortune 500 over the period 1998-2002. Their results show 
support for the positive effect of diversity on financial performance measured by Tobin‘s Q. 
Smith, Smith and Verner, (2005) examined the relationship between gender diversity and firm 
performance using 2,500 largest Danish firms over the period 1993-2001, and find that the 
proportion of women on the board have a positive effect on firm performance. Oxelheim and 
Randoy (2001) examined the effect of foreign board member diversity on firm value in Norway 
and Sweden, and the result indicates a significantly higher performance for firms with foreign 
board membership. However, Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009) examined the effect of 
demographic diversity on firm performance of listed companies in Malaysia. Their results 
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suggest that board diversity is not relevant to firm performance. Randoy, Thomsen, and 
Oxelheim (2006) analyzed board diversity and its impacts on the corporate performance of the 
500 largest companies from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden and found find no significant 
diversity effect of gender, age, and nationality on stock market performance or on return on 
assets. 
The empirical research presents contradictory findings on the value of diversity. Watson, Kumar, 
and Michealson (1993) report that a homogeneous board is better in the short-term, while a 
heterogeneous board is better in the long-term in achieving corporate goals. However, Pelled, 
Eisenhardt, and Xin (1999) found that a heterogeneous board resulted in an emotional conflict 
that ultimately harmed firm performance. Nigeria is made of about 250 ethnic groups and 500 
languages. These ethnic groups are broadly classified into major and minor tribes. The major 
tribes are Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba. In the past, prominent political positions revolved around the 
three major tribes. A board that is ethnically diffused in Nigeria may have a strong board capital. 
Board capital has been positively associated with the provision of advice and counsel, the 
provision of firm legitimacy and reputation, the provision of channels of communication and the 
acquirement of resource elements outside the firm, and a source of effective performance.The 
researcher examined this variable using a dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the board is made 
up of people from different tribes and 0 if otherwise, and propose that. 
(Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu, and Nwako, 2013) made use of a panel of 122 listed firms in  Nigeria 
studying gender, ethnic and board National diversity,  making use of the fixed effect generalized 
least square regression analysis method for analysis from the period of 1991- 2008 (23 yrs). They 
found out that gender diversity was negatively related to firms' performance. While both national 
and ethnical diversity had a positive movement (relationship) with the firm's performance. One 
of these reasons was that foreign board members were found to be better qualified in terms of 
competence, board, and industrial experience.  
Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton, and Sara Prince (2015) obtained data from 366 publicly traded 
companies all across a range of industries from Canada, Latin America, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. They found out that top quartile Companies for ethnic diversity are 35 
percent more likely to have financial returns above national industry medians. Top quartile 
Companies for racial diversity are 15 percent more likely to have financial returns above national 
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industry medians. Racial and ethnic diversity has a stronger impact on financial performance in 
the United States than gender diversity, perhaps because earlier efforts to increase women's 
representation in the top levels of business have already yielded positive results. According to 
(Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton, and Sara Prince, 2015) In the United Kingdom, greater gender 
diversity on the senior-executive team corresponded to the highest performance uplift in our 
dataset: for every 10 percent increase in gender diversity, EBIT rose by 3.5 percent. While 
certain industries perform better on gender diversity and other industries on the unequal 
performance of companies in the same industry and the same country implies that diversity is a 
competitive differentiator shifting market share toward more diverse companies (Vivian Hunt, 
Dennis Layton, and Sara Prince, 2015). The United Kingdom does comparatively better in racial 
diversity, albeit at a low level: some 78 percent of UK companies have senior-leadership teams 
that fail to reflect the demographic composition of the country's labor force and population, 
compared with 91 percent in Brazil and 97 percent for the United States (Vivian Hunt, Dennis 
Layton, and Sara Prince, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The chapter three of the study reveals the parameters, techniques and procedures used in 
sourcing, collecting and analysing data. The following subject matter depicts the study’s 
research design, sample selection, population Justification, sample size, data collection and 
analysis technique, and model specification. 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to effectively attempt to measure the influence that ethnic and national diversity in a 
corporate board will have on a firm’s financial performance, the study made use of Ex-post 
factor research design which deals grouped variables that are not randomly assigned. 
Characteristics like traits and attributes for instance, gender, race, nationalities, religion (i.e. 
Grouped variables such as national diversity and ethnic diversity) are analysed against the 
dependable variable. Secondary panel data were used for this study because standard time 
series or cross-sectional data which make up the panel data regression used in Ujunwa, 
Okoyeuzu and Nwakoby, 2012; (Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe & Onyewo, 2015) as cited by Oyeleke, 
2016 can enable the analysis of more complex issues because it combines both forms of the 
data element (Bremholm, 2015; Oyeleke, 2016).  Secondary data were the most appropriate for 
this study as a result of the easy and quick access to the financial statement of firms on the 
internet. Also, the fact that the majority of prior studies used corporate websites and annual 
reports provides a greater potential for comparison of results (Uwuigbe, 2011).  
Extraction of financial information and other corporate information (like board diversity) for 
analysis is usually easily accessed and can be appropriately sourced from the websites of firms 
in the Nigerian stock exchange.(Oxelheim and Randoy, 2001; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 
2003; Carter, D’souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2007;  Lehman & 
Dufrene 2008Ararat, Aksu and Cetin, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2010; Darmadi, 2011; 
Omoye, Alade, &Eriki, 2013; Cimerovaa, Dodda, & Frijnsa, 2014; Protasovs, 2015; Oyeleke, 
2016) all with similar research topics, made use of secondary data extracted from the internet. 
The analysis will be carried out using Ordinary least square regression which shows the degree 
of influence between two variables. Data will be collected for each period ended from 2012-
2015. The method for analysis of data is  
3.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
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The study initially made use of random sampling (a probability-based sample selection 
technique). Agencies, such as Statistics New Zealand, insist on probability-based sampling 
methods because they are free from bias and objective (Doherty, 1994). The study made a 
probability sampling of the random selection 91 firms out of 119 listed firms [minus financial 
services sector (57 firms)] with the use of Taro Yameni sample selection formula. During the 
cause of sample selection, the study had to further select fewer samples by applying purposive 
(judgmental) sampling method due to the fact that it selected those firms that operate on the 
statutory period (i.e. From January 1st to December 31st), for the purpose of consistency. 
Judgmental sampling is a non-random sampling method that is subjective and can be used 
when specific data requirements that are needed are used as a benchmark for sample selection. 
This method previously used by (Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe & Onyewo, 2015; Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe, 
Adeyemo & Anowai, 2016) is needed basically because panel data deal with data from samples 
that are consistent with the given range of periods used (there must not be any anomaly in 
information available within an intended sample).  The main objective of the sampling is to 
collect information from participants whose information’s are consistent and easily accessible 
to the researcher (Ilker, Sulaiman and Rukayya, 2016). Not all members of a population can be 
used due to the fact that the characteristics of all the samples in a population might differ, for 
example, the characteristics and qualities of the firms in Nigerian stock exchange (NSE) in 
terms of firm size, period of operation, and other could differ. This is the reason why only 
listed firms of similarities in size and period would be eligible for sample use; this is to ensure 
consistency and validity of results. The aim of the study is to use financial reports of the period 
of 2012-2015 (4yrs), this is because most listed firms to the best of knowledge do not have 
their 2011 reports on Nigerian stock exchange (NSE). The first IFRS reporting date for listed 
firms began from on the 1st of January, 2012 as the pronouncement was made by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) on the date of adoption (Nassar, Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe & Abuwa, 
2014). The reason for the period 2012-2015 is that the Nigerian Federal Executive Council 
announced the approval of the Nigerian IFRS roadmap on the 28th of July 2010, (Madawaki, 
2012). This roadmap provides various information on the strategized adoption plan, which 
showed that the transition timeline starts with public listed entities and significant public 
interest entities who should report in the year 2012 comparable statements (starting January 1, 
2011) (Isa, 2014). The year for analysis began with 2012 because 2012 was when the IFRS 
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reporting year for listed companies began.The financial reports for the period ended 2016 are 
not yet published for most the firms so 2015 was used instead so as to ensure consistency in the 
range of 2012-2015 is most appropriate. 
The sample selection method used for this study was the application of the Taro Yemeni 
formula for sample size determination, this sample size calculation method have been seen as 
acceptable in the works of several authors such as (Uwuigbe, 2011; Fakile, 2011; Umeilika, 
2013; Afuberoh, Dennis1 & Okoye, 2014;  Adetula, Owolabi and Onyinye, 2014; Gbedi and 
Adebisi, 2015). Yamane Taro sample selection formula is given as the following: (n= N / [1+ 
(Ne2)]). 
Where the: 
n= sample size of listed firms, 
N = population of listed firms used,  
e = error limit of which is 0.05 in this study. 
3.3.1 Population Justification 
The study narrows its focus on listed firms from all industries in the Nigerian stock exchange 
(NSE). The population of the study has to be Nigerian based and must not go out of the scope 
of the Nigerian stock exchange. Few researchers have explored similar study of this within the 
scope of Nigeria within the context of cultural, ethical and national diversity (Omoye, Alade 
and Eriki, 2013). The study will make use of annual reports firms in all the sectors excluding 
that of the financial sector, this is because certain financial reporting rules of the financial 
sector differ from another firm. Also, the bodies governing and regulating acts such as the 
Bank and Other Financial Institution Act (BOFIA) issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) have specific reporting requirements that are different from other firms. The total 
numbers of listed firms are 176 as at the current study date and financial service constitutes of 
57 firms as of the date of study. An exemption of the financial services will bring a remainder 
of 119 firms available as feasible population of study 
3.3.2 Sample Size Justification 
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Using Yaro Yamane’s formula as show above earlier (n= N / [1+ (Ne2)] ). 
 n= 119/ [1+ (119 x 0.052)] ) 
n= 119/ [1+0.2975] 
n=119/1.2975 = 91.7 approximately 92 firms as sample size. 
The study will make use of 60 firms because of consistency in the period of operation; only 
firms that use the statutory period (i.e. January 1st to December 31st) were preferred so as to 
ensure uniformity and consistency of financial report information. The study will also make 
use of 60 firms as a result of information available as some firms do not have all the reports 
published on the Nigerian stock exchange site from (2012-2015). 60 firms out of 92 depict a 
valid percent to 65.2% (i.e. The valid/ usable percentage of Yaro Yamane sample size). Also 
60 firms out of 119 represent 50.4% of 11 listed companies in the Nigerian stock exchange out 
of an available population of 119 firms (with the exemption of financial service sector).  
In order to fully capture a relevant percentage sample of the entire population of study a 
systematical approach was used in selecting samples from each industrial sector on the stock 
exchange, of which about 50% samples each were selected from each industry so as to avoid 
bias and cover a good percentage of the whole industries and consistent with (Krejcie and 
Morgan, 1970) rule which accept a minimum of 5%. Half a population is a great representative 
of that population as sixty (60) is more than 50% of a population of 119. 
3.4. DATA COLLECTION 
Method for data collection will majorly be through the internet, the Nigerian stock exchange 
(NSE) website. Secondary data collection method is most appropriate and convenient when 
seeking to extract any information about a firm’s financial health. The major data needed for 
computation of the financial performance of any firm is through secondary data. Data was 
retrieved from secondary sources such as the published annual reports on Nigerian stock 
exchange (NSE) and when not found, from the company’s website or other financial websites 
such as CapitalAssets.com. Similar to Chaharsoughi and Rahman (2013), the information 
related to the board of directors’ Ethnicity and nationality is precisely obtained through a 
manual search from the section of the director’s profile contained in annual reports and the 
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websites of the sample firms. The secondary data collection method for the purpose of the 
study was mostly from published articles, financial reports of the listed companies and other 
existing literature.  
 
3.5. DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE AND INSTRUMENT 
The financial report for periods 2012-2015 of the sampled 60 firms was accessed from the 
Nigerian stock exchange (NSE) site. The profit after tax (PAT), total assets, and total liabilities 
for each of the year were recorded in Microsoft Excel 2007. The study made use of financial 
measurement variable; specifically profitability and growth variables. The profitability variables 
used are ROE and ROA, while the growth variable used is TOBIN’S Q ratio. These variables 
were calculated as thus: The total equity (total asset-total liability), ROE (PAT/ total equity), 
ROA (PAT/ total asset), and Tobin Q ratio (total firm value/total asset value) was calculated 
using Microsoft Excel with their respective formulas. The results from these calculations were 
easily imported into E-views 8 Econometrics package. The E-views 8 Econometrics package is a 
standard and highly recognised statistical package in economics for analysis and can be used 
across various fields in business and social sciences. It can also be used in the pure and applied 
sciences for few analyses. The E-views 8 Econometrics package was used for final result 
analysis, of which we were able to run the panel data regression model of both fixed and random 
effects. The covariance analyses with inclusion of correlation analysis were firstly run with E-
views 8 Econometrics package, in order to see the significance of relationship between all 
variables. The unit root test was a test that showed if each of the financial performance 
parameters were stationary before we proceeded with the panel data regression. 
 
The E-views 8 Econometrics package had an acceptable mode of data imputation, so certain 
adjustments had to be made in order to import data correctly. For instance, ETHDIVRS 
represents Ethnic diversity in the board and is measured using the possible combinative ethnic 
group representatives on the board of each sampled firm will be indicated as follows:   
SEG = single ethnic group, (i.e. The existence of only Hausa or Igbo or Yoruba only in a board) 
E-views 8 Econometrics package input value is represented as = 0, which shows no diversity 
DEG = double ethnic group, (i.e. The existence of any two combinations of Hausa, Igbo and 
Yoruba in a board) E-views 8 Econometrics package input value is represented as = 1, which 
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depicts diversity in the board. Finally the last coded imputation which is TEG = triple ethnic 
group, ( i.e. The combination of all ethnic diversity group in a single board) E-views 8 
Econometrics package imput value is represented as = 3 
 
3.6. MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
This section gives the reader a better understanding of how the variables used in the study were 
mapped out and measured in order to extract valid data for interpretation. The independent 
variables and dependent variables are Board diversity (ethnic and national) and financial 
performance respectively. The measured variables that were used as indicators of the financial 
performance of the listed firms are Return on asset (ROA), Return on equity (ROE) and 
Tobin’s Q ratio. These financial measurement variables were calculated for each of the listed 
firms on a yearly basis from 2012-2015 using the following formula: ROE (PAT/ total equity), 
ROA (PAT/ total asset), and Tobin Q ratio (total firm value/total asset value. The data were 
extracted and documented for the 60 firms. The independent variable (board diversity) has two 
sub-variables which are the main focus of this study. These are national diversity (i.e. Also 
known as the presence of foreign director) and ethnic diversity. The independent variable was 
measured as follows: 
 
National Diversity: The corporate information displayed in the financial reports of the listed 
firms usually indicate if the directors are foreign or not by revealing their countries. This has 
made it easy for this work to identify a foreign director or to know if the board of a firm has 
national diversity. 
Ethnic diversity: One of the ways this study has been able to identify the direction of a 
different ethnicity is through their names. Though, to some extent, nowadays there is a level at 
which the name of a person reveals his or her tribe and ethnic group. 
3.6.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable of this study is financial performance. Financial performance would be 
measured using financial indicators such as return on Equity (ROE), Return on asset (ROA), 
and Earnings per share (EPS). Tobin Q would be used as the primary measuring tool for firm 
performance in this study. 
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3.6.2 Independent Variables  
The independent variables of this study are National diversity and Ethnic diversity. Board 
diversity in this study is narrowed down to National diversity (deals with foreign directors) and 
Ethnic diversity (Narrowed to Nigeria: Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba) 
3.6.3 Control Variables 
There is the need to control for other factors correlated to earnings predictability based on prior 
studies (Labelle et al. 2010). This study utilised the control for firm characteristics such as firm 
size, performance, governance variables such as the size of the board, external audit quality and 
lastly, the adoption of IFRS. The control variable selected for this study is the board size. This 
was chosen because prior Nigerian based studies such as (Omoye, Alade and Eriki, 2013) made 
use of a firm’s size as a control variable. This study seeks to fill in that gap. The performance 
variable is quantified using the return on asset employed (ROA), Return on Equity and Tobin Q. 
These are used because they show the profit earned per value of assets and also reflects the 
management capability in utilizing firms’ financial and tangible resources to generate profits 
(Darmadi, 2011). It is implied that when the firm is performing well, there are lower incentives 
to manage earnings, which increase its ability to predict future outcomes. It is then computed by 
dividing the operating income before interest and taxes by total assets of the firm. 
3.7. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The study made use of a model adapted from the studies of (Marimuthu, 2011; and Omoye, 
Alade and Eriki, 2013). The adaptation of the model to this study is suitable because the work of 
(Marimuthu, 2011) and this work are similar in terms of scope and but different in terms of 
approach and direction. (Omoye, Alade and Eriki, 2013) made use of return on equity as a base 
measurement of Companies’ performance and adapted their specifications to that of Marimuthu, 
(2011) on ethnic diversity (i.e. Dividing non-Malay directors with the total directors using ROE). 
The model adaptation is described as follows: 
ROEί =Ƞ0 + Ƞ1 HAUSA ἱ + Ƞ2 YORUBAἱ+ Ƞ3 IGBOἱ+ Ƞ4 ASSETἱ+ ε ἱt … (1) 
Incorporated into this study it will become… 
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Firm performanceit =Ƞ0 +Ƞ1 ETHDIVRSἱ +Ƞ2 NATIONDIVRSἱ +Ƞ3 BOARDSIZEἱ  + ε ἱt 
… (2)  
Firm performance is a general representation of the performance measures that was used for the 
study. The individual performance measures are depicted below: 
ROEίt = Ƞ0 + Ƞ1 ETHDIVRSἱ +Ƞ2 NATIONDIVRSἱ +Ƞ3 BOARDSIZEἱ  + ε ἱt …  (3) 
ROAίt = Ƞ0 + Ƞ1 ETHDIVRSἱ +Ƞ2 NATIONDIVRSἱ +Ƞ3 BOARDSIZEἱ  + ε ἱt … (4) 
TOBIN’S Qίt = Ƞ0 +Ƞ1 ETHDIVRSἱ +Ƞ2 NATIONDIVRSἱ +Ƞ3 BOARDSIZEἱ  + ε ἱt … (5) 
ε ἱ 1= Error term  and Aprori sign: Ƞ ἱ ˃ or ˂0 
Where variables:  
NATIONDIVRS represents national diversity which stands for the representation of foreign 
directors (directors from countries other than the country of firm’s origin) in the board. 
Independent variable, ETHDIVRS represents Ethnic diversity in the board and is measured using 
the possible combinative ethnic group representation in the board of each sampled firm will be 
indicated as follows:   
SEG= single ethnic group, (i.e.the existence of only Hausa or Igbo or Yoruba only in a board) 
SPSS input value is represented as = 0, which shows no diversity 
DEG= diverse ethnic groups, (i.e.the existence of any two or more combinations of Hausa, Igbo 
and Yoruba in a board) SPSS input value is represented as = 1, which depicts diversity in the 
board. 
The control variable for this study is firm size, the same used in the work of (Omoye, Alade and 
Eriki, 2013) which is depicted in the model stated above using the firm’s asset as a measure of 
firm size. The study made use of a financed based measure of the dependent variable (firm’s 
performance) which is Return of asset, ROA is measured as follows:   
 
Figure 3.0: Formula for ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q 
              Profit after tax           Net profit  
ROA=                              and   ROE= 
               Total Asset    Total Value of Equity 
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                                             Total Market Value of firm 
Tobin Q ratio Formula: = ------------------------------------------ 
                                                 Total Asset value  
 
Gender diversity is the percentage of male or female composition of the board (Williams, 2000; 
Swartz and Firer, 2005). This, therefore, implies Ethnic diversity in board refers to the 
percentage representation of any combination of Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba in the board of a firm. 
In this study when there is more than one ethnic group it represents a level of ethnic diversity, 
but when it is a single ethnic group present it mean there is no ethnic diversity. This is in 
exception to boards that have foreign members in their board. This study intends to use the panel 
data regression model to ascertain the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variable.  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter shows the analysis of data collected and its interpretation. The study had the main 
objective of ascertaining the influence that ethnic and national diversity in a corporate board will 
have on a firm’s financial performance. To achieve this objective, the study made use of panel 
research design. This chapter begins its exhibition from section 4.1, which shows the test ran to 
show if the financial performance determinants are stationary. The unit root test was used in this 
section. 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVES 
Table 4.0: Descriptive statistics 
 BODSIZE ETHDIV NATDIV ROA ROE TOBIN_Q 
 Mean  8.710084  2.403361  0.588235  0.012063 -0.384073  0.404668 
 Median  9.000000  2.000000  1.000000  0.029490  0.069196  0.450558 
 Maximum  21.00000  3.000000  1.000000  0.839554  5.068578  13.5206 
 Minimum  4.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.985136 -102.6472 -17.45409 
 Std. Dev.  2.733598  0.653705  0.493190  0.145083  6.700296  1.956588 
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 Probability  0.000000  0.000048  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Sum  2073.000  572.0000  140.0000  2.871059 -91.40943  96.31087 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev.  1770.996  101.2773  57.64706  4.988612  10639.87  907.2920 
 Observation
s 
 238  238  238  238  238  238 
  
The statistical table shown above helps explain the descriptive from the sample sample that was 
used and analysed. This table shows the mean, median, standard deviation, Skewdness,  Jarque-
Bera, probability (significance of values of the table) and the number of useful observations. 
Mean: mean represents the average value of a group of relatable value (like a series) usually 
depicted in numerical signs and obtained by summing up the series and dividing it by the number 
of observations. The mean values for all the used variables in this study were calculated and the 
above result is explained. The mean value of ethnic diversity, ( 2.403361), approximately (2), to 
the nearest whole number. This implies that the board of non-financial firms in the Nigerian 
stock exchange have a level of ethnic diversity of at least two major ethnic group representations, 
i.e. a combination (in doubles) of either Yoruba, house and igbo. This reveals that an average 
corporate board of the non-financial firms of the Nigerian stock exchange have a level of ethnic 
diversity, however it was observed that a number of firms amongst this sampled firms have no 
ethnic diversity. 
 
The board size has an average value of (8.710084), approximately nine (9). This imply to the fact 
that the board of non-financial firms in the Nigerian stock exchange had nine (9) as the average 
number of directors on the board based on the data of year 2012-2015 meeting the Nigerian 
corporate governance code requirement. However, some firms in specific do not have  board 
size, reaching the stipulated number required as specified in the Nigerian code, the highest 
number of boards is twenty (21) as shown above (maximum), and the minimum is four (4) as 
shown which is less than the requirement. The national diversity has an average value of 
(0.588235), approximately one (0.6=1). This also there explains the fact that the board of non-
financial firms in the Nigerian stock exchange has one(1) as the average number of foreign 
representatives which is a solid representation. The financial performance measurements of 
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ROA, ROE, and TOBIN’S Q have average values of (0.012063), (-0.384073) and (0.404668) 
respectively. This also explains the fact that there is a need for more than one financial measure 
in determining the level of a firm financial performance because the values vary. For instance, 
ROE above showed that the firms have a poor performance on the average, ROE have a negative 
mean, while ROA and TOBIN’S Q have positive mean which showed a reasonable performance 
level. The positive mean from Tobin’s Q ratio reveal that the growth of firm around the sampled 
firm is steady on an average. 
Median: The median is the middle value of s series. It is also the average of the two middle 
values ordered from the largest to the smallest or vice-versa depending on whether the number of 
observations is an odd or even numeric value. Mean have better reliable outcome; this is because 
it is a good measure of center of distribution and it is less sensitive to outliers than the result of 
mean.  
The median above shows similar results to the mean with respect to the results of the Ethnic 
diversity (ETHDIVE = 2), National diversity (NATDIV = 1), and Board diversity (BODSIZE = 
9). The result above help to validate the result of the mean, due to the fact that the values 
provided by the mean are reliable. 
 
Probability: the probability above shows the degree to which all the values presented in the table 
are significant. The percentage of statistical significance must not be more than 0.05 (5%). From 
this, we can say that all the values shown in the above table are significant because all of the 
probability values are less than 0.05 (5%). 
4.2 UNIT ROOT TEST  
 
Table 4.1: Result of unit root test  
 
Financial 
performance 
determinants 
                                                       Unit Root Test Methods 
PP – Fisher Chi-square 
 
ADF - Fisher Chi-
square 
 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 
 
Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** Statistic Prob.** 
ROE  97.7944  0.0025  93.2359  0.0063 -30.3420  0.0000 
ROA  90.0950  0.0114  82.2523  0.0436 -30.6269  0.0000 
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TOBIN_Q  169.121  0.0000  144.922  0.0000 -104.621  0.0000 
       
Source: Researcher’s computation, 2017 
The unit root test is a test that reveals the variables that have unit root. The criterion for decision 
are based on the requirement laid out by Levin, Lin and chu (2002), Augmented Dickey Fuller 
test (ADF- Fisher Chi-square) and Philips-Perron (PP-Fisher Chi-square). The other methods in 
agreement with the above are (Breitung, 2000; Im, Pesaran, and Shin, 2003).  
Stationarity Testing 
This study makes use of time series data because  it makes use of years (years = t). A time series 
is said to be stationary (in the weak sense) if its statistical properties do not vary with time 
(expectation, variance, autocorrelation). The study also makes use of cross-sectional data which 
is data across firms in the Nigerian stock exchange and unit root test can be used to test  
Stationarity test 
Interpreting the Levin, Lin and chu (2002) method: 
Null hypothesis (H0): panel data has unit root (assume the common unit root process) when it is 
above 5% i.e. greater than 0.05. Then it is not a stationary data. 
Alt hypothesis (H1): panel data has not unit root when the probability is above 5% i.e. greater 
than 0.05. 
For instance, assuming probability is less than 5% i.e. 0.05, then the Null hypothesis (H0) should 
be accepted and the Alternative hypothesis (H1) should be rejected, meaning that the Null 
hypothesis panel data has not unit root and the alternative hypothesis has unit root. Then it is a 
stationary data. 
Interpreting the Fisher Type test using ADF and PP test (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001 
which assumes an individual unit root process): 
Null hypothesis (H0): panel data has unit root (assume the individual unit root process) when 
the probability is above 5% i.e. greater than 0.05. Then it is not a stationary data.  
ALT hypothesis (H1): panel data has not unit root when probability is above 5% i.e. greater 
than 0.05. s 
For instance, assuming probability is less than 5%,  i.e. 0.05, then the Null hypothesis (H0) 
should be accepted and the Alternative hypothesis (H1) should be rejected, meaning that the Null 
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hypothesis panel data has not unit root and the alternative hypothesis has a unit root Then it is a 
stationary data. 
In accordance with the above methods, we can say that if the panel data of each variable does not 
have a unit root in its Null hypothesis, then it is a stationary data so we accept the Null 
hypothesis. We can easily interpret the data shown in the above table to aid understanding. 
4.2.1 ROE (Return on Equity) 
The first financial performance variable which is ROE shows a below 5% probability shows that 
ROA variable is stationary and has no unit root, using the three methods as shown below. 
Levin, Lin and chu = (0.0000) 
ADF- Fisher Chi-square = (0.0063) 
PP-Fisher Chi-square = (0.0025) 
Decision: Accept the null hypothesis H0 and reject the alternative hypothesis H1 
Implication of results (interpretation) 
The data is stationary given all the above methods for ROE with Levin, Lin and chu = (0.0000), 
ADF- Fisher Chi-square = (0.0063) and PP-Fisher Chi-square = (0.0025) all below 5%. This 
shows that the data has no unit root and therefore its statistical properties do not vary with time 
(expectation, variance, autocorrelation), which proves its test of time and reliability. 
4.2.2 ROA (Return on Asset) 
The first financial performance variable which is ROA shows a below 5% probability. This 
shows that ROA variable is stationary and has no unit root, using the three methods as shown 
below. 
Levin, Lin and chu = (0.0000) 
ADF- Fisher Chi-square = (0.0436) 
PP-Fisher Chi-square = (0.0114) 
Decision: Accept the null hypothesis H0 and reject the alternative hypothesis H1 
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Implication of results (interpretation) 
The data is stationary given all the above methods for ROA with Levin, Lin and chu = (0.0000), 
ADF- Fisher Chi-square = (0.0436) and PP-Fisher Chi-square = (0.0114) all below 5%. This 
shows that the data has no unit root and therefore its statistical properties do not vary with time 
(expectation, variance, autocorrelation), which proves its test of time and reliability. 
4.2.3 TOBIN Q Ratio 
The first financial performance variable which is Tobin Q shows a below 5% probability shows 
that ROA variable is stationary and has no unit root, using the three methods as shown below. 
Levin, Lin and chu = (0.0000) 
ADF- Fisher Chi-square = (0.0000) 
PP-Fisher Chi-square = (0.0000) 
Decision: Accept the null hypothesis H0 and reject the alternative hypothesis H1 
Implication of results (interpretation) 
The data is stationary given all the above methods for Tobin’s Q with Levin, Lin and chu = 
(0.0000), ADF- Fisher Chi-square = (0.0000) and PP-Fisher Chi-square = (0.0000) all below 5%. 
This shows that the data has no unit root and therefore its statistical properties do not vary with 
time (expectation, variance, autocorrelation), which proves its test of time and reliability. 
4.3. COVARRIANCE AND CORRELATION  
The table below is the covariance analysis of the data, showing the t- statistic, correlations 
between variables and significance (p-value) 
Table 4. 2: Covariance Analysis: Spearman rank-order     
Sample: 2012 2015      
Included observations: 238       
Balanced sample (listwise missing value 
deletion)      
Degree-of-freedom corrected covariances     
        
        Covariance       
Correlation       
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t-Statistic       
Probability BODSIZE  ETHDIV  NATDIV  TOBIN_Q  ROA  ROE  
BODSIZE  4645.850       
 1.000000       
 -----        
 -----        
        
ETHDIV  993.9241 3827.848      
 0.235691 1.000000      
 3.725717 -----       
 0.0002 -----       
        
NATDIV  1393.354 -433.8228 3444.473     
 0.348311 -0.119474 1.000000     
 5.708322 -1.848637 -----      
 0.0000 0.0658 -----      
        
TOBIN_Q  143.3945 -349.4177 114.9831 4740.150    
 0.030557 -0.082030 0.028456 1.000000    
 0.469637 -1.264427 0.437329 -----     
 0.6390 0.2073 0.6623 -----     
        
ROA  -7.581224 -551.5696 149.8797 804.3882 4740.146   
 -0.001616 -0.129487 0.037092 0.169697 1.000000   
 -0.024818 -2.006111 0.570218 2.645299 -----    
 0.9802 0.0460 0.5691 0.0087 -----    
        
ROE  292.1308 -428.6076 -9.037975 -621.4852 3328.253 4740.156 
 0.062251 -0.100620 -0.002237 -0.131111 0.702141 1.000000 
 0.958181 -1.553645 -0.034361 -2.031700 15.14875 -----  
 0.3390 0.1216 0.9726 0.0433 0.0000 -----  
                Result interpretation and implication 
The results above are going to be interpreted and explain in relation to real occurrences 
associated with the sampled firms. The result above provides figures for covariance, correlation, 
t-statistic, and P-value (significance) but we shall be discussing the results of Covariance, 
correlation  and probability only. 
Tobin’s Q has a positive, negative and positive covariance with Board size, ethnic diversity and 
national diversity respectively. ROA has a negative, negative and positive covariance with Board 
size, ethnic diversity and national diversity respectively. Finally ROE has a positive, negative 
and negative covariance with Board size, ethnic diversity and national diversity respectively 
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This therefore implies that TOBIN’S Q has more positive joint variability between its mean and 
that of the diversity variables (i.e. With Board size and National diversity). Covariance could 
also be used to measure the strength of correlation between two random variables. 
 
Correlation: The correlation and probability figure shows that Tobin’s Q has an insignificant 
positive relationship with board size (0.030557) and national diversity (0.028456) but has a 
negative insignificant relationship with ethnic diversity (-0.082030). The above table also shows 
that there is an insignificant negative relationship between ROA and Board size (-0.001616), 
insignificant positive relationship between ROA and national diversity (0.037092). But also 
shows a significant negative relationship between ROA and ethnic diversity (-0.129487) with 
significant level of (0.0460) within 5%. The results under ROE show that ROE has an 
insignificant positive relationship with board size (0.062251) and negative relationship with 
national diversity (-0.100620) and ethnic diversity (-0.002237). The results shown in the above 
table also reveals a positive significant relationship between board size (BODSIZE) and ethnic 
diversity (ETHDIV) which can explain that boards with bigger size tend to be more diverse 
ethnically amongst these sampled firms. It also shows a significant positive relationship between 
board size (BODSIZE) and national diversity (NATDIV) which also shows that board size 
increase is in reciprocal to the increase in the number foreign directors.  
   
4.4 PANEL DATA REGRESSION MODEL 
Under the panel data regression model, there are two basic model effects which are: The fixed 
Effect Model and The Random Effect Model. Using the panel data regression model any of this 
method can be used as a benchmark for regression analysis.  
4.4.1 The Hausman Test 
In order to choose objectively and based on the most appropriate effect that would produce the 
precise result, we needed to run the Hausman Test. The Hausman test helps a researcher to 
know the best effect between the random effect model and fixed effect model that will best 
explain the variables in a typical panel data regression model. Under the Hausman test, if the 
probability is below 5% (0.05) then it the most appropriate effect to be used is fixed effect and if 
the probability is above 5% (0.05) then random effect is most appropriate. 
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Table 4.3: HAUSMAN TEST RESULTS 
                                  HAUSMAN TEST 
Variables Probability 
ROE  0.1047 
ROA 0.6317 
TOBIN Q 0.9989  
Source: Researcher’s computation, 2017 
From the above, we can deduce that the probability percentage for all the variables in Hausman 
test is above 5% (0.05), which proves that random effect is a more appropriate selection for 
regression analysis. 
4.4.2 Random Effect Ordinary Least Square results 
The random effect least squares were run for each of the financial performance 
variables/indicators (the independent variables) and below showed the results extracted directly 
from the E-views 8 Econometrics package.  
4.4.2.1Return on Asset 
The two stage least square formula imputed as a command to produce the regression is shown as 
follows: 
Command as imputed into Eviews8:  
 
LS(CX=F) ROA C ETHDIV NATDIV BODSIZE 
Estimation Equation: 
ROA = C(1) + C(2)*ETHDIV + C(3)*NATDIV + C(4)*BODSIZE + [CX=F] 
Substituted Coefficients: 
ROA = -0.247914817131 + 0.0787532010762*ETHDIV + 0.1241156705*NATDIV - 
0.00026446684534*BODSIZE + [CX=F] 
 
Below are the tabulated least square regression results 
Table 4.4: ROA Regression Results 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -0.247915 0.200680 -1.235376 0.2183 
ETHDIV 0.078753 0.058737 1.340782 0.1817 
NATDIV 0.124116 0.127045 0.976941 0.3299 
BODSIZE -0.000264 0.018621 -0.014203 0.9887 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
     
     
R-squared 0.433793     Mean dependent var 0.012063 
Adjusted R-squared -0.233194     S.D. dependent var 0.145083 
S.E. of regression 0.127045     Durbin-Watson stat 2.393132 
Sum squared resid 2.824586     Akaike info criterion        -1.066620 
Log likelihood 189.9278     Schwarz criterion -0.147490 
F-statistic 2.162490   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000046        
     
 
Coefficient 
Firstly attention should be focus on the coefficient, which describes the relationship, influence 
and the direction between the dependent variable (ROA) and the independent variables 
(NATDIV, ETHDIV), the control variable (BODSIZE). The results of coefficient of ETHDIV 
from the above table shows that ETHDIV has approximately (0.08), 8% positive influence on 
ROA (i.e. Has no influence). This means if ETHDIV in the board of a firm increases by one (1) 
additional member of one of the three ethnic groups, then ROA would have 8% positive changes 
in value without considering the level of significance. The results of coefficient of NATDIV 
from the above table show that NATDIV has approximately 12% positive influence on ROA. 
This means if NATDIV in the board of a firm increases by one (1) additional foreign member, 
then ROA would have 12% positive changes in value without regarding level of significance. 
BODSIZE from the above table show that BODSIZE has approximately 0% positive influence 
on ROA. This means if BODSIZE increases by one (1) more member, then ROA would have no 
change in value 
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Significance 
In terms of the significance of probability we see NATDIV in the probability column reads 
(0.3299), which can be interpreted as 33% significance. The state of significance in probability 
starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. This, 
therefore, concludes that NATDIV has no significant relationship with ROA. This implies that 
regardless of the coefficient results if the board of a firm increases the number of foreign 
directors there would be no change in the financial performance of that firm using ROA as the 
performance parameter. We can also see that ETHDIV, in the probability column reads (0.1817), 
which can be interpreted as 18% significance. The state of significance in probability starts from 
0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. This therefore means that 
ETHDIV also has no significant relationship with ROA. This implies that regardless of the 
coefficient results if the board of a firm increases the number of members of the three ethnic 
groups there would be no change in the financial performance of that firm using ROA as the 
performance parameter. We can also see that BODSIZE, in the probability column reads 
(0.9887), which can interpreted as 98.9% significance. The state of significance in probability 
starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. This therefore 
concludes that BODSIZE also has no significant relationship with ROA. This implies that 
regardless of the coefficient results, if the board of a firm increases the number of directors there 
would be no change in the financial performance of that firm using ROA as the performance 
parameter 
 
R-squared (can explain variation). As we see, 0.433793 above shows that 43.4% variation of 
ROA can jointly be explained by ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE. In other words, ETHDIV, 
NATDIV, and BODSIZE can jointly influence 43% variation of the outcome of ROA, which is 
a very little significant influence. 100%-43% = approximately 57% variation of ROA can be 
explained by outside variables not captured in the study. This percentage, 47%, is reasonable 
owing to the fact that this study is a behavioural inclined research where it involves the effect of 
dynamic and unpredictable variables like board of directors (humans).  The diversity in board is 
highly dependent on the certain un-captured factor like the behavior of each member, 
personality, competence and so on that could influence the performance of a firm. The 
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significance is also confirmed in the probability value of prob(F-statistic) 0.000046, which is 0% 
i.e. it is significant. The significance of probability must be below (0.05) 5%. 
 
4.4.2.2 Tobin’s Q ratio 
 
The two stage least square formula imputed as a command to produce the regression is shows as 
follows: 
Command as imputed into Eviews8:  
LS(CX=F) TOBIN_Q C ETHDIV NATDIV BODSIZE 
Estimation Equation: 
TOBIN_Q = C(1) + C(2)*ETHDIV + C(3)*NATDIV + C(4)*BODSIZE + [CX=F] 
Substituted Coefficients: 
TOBIN_Q = 0.681223623121 - 0.0934067234135*ETHDIV + 0.0616189389999*NATDIV - 
0.0101391022331*BODSIZE + [CX=F] 
 
Table 4.5: Tobin Q Regression Results 
 
 
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C 0.681224 3.520225 0.193517 0.8468 
ETHDIV -0.093407 1.030331 -0.090657 0.9279 
NATDIV 0.061619 2.228565 0.027650 0.9780 
BODSIZE -0.010139 0.326637 -0.031041 0.9753 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
     
     
R-squared 0.042053    Mean dependent var 0.404668 
Adjusted R-squared -0.297334    S.D. dependent var 1.956588 
S.E. of regression 2.228565    Durbin-Watson stat 1.476950 
Sum squared resid 869.1377    Akaike info criterion        4.662520 
Log likelihood -491.8399    Schwarz criterion 5.581650 
F-statistic 0.123908  
Prob(F-statistic) 1.000000        
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The coefficient, which describes the relationship, influence and the direction between the 
dependent variable (TOBIN’S Q) and the independent variables (ETHDIV, NATDIV), the 
control variable (BODSIZE). The results of coefficient of ETHDIV from the above table show 
that ETHDIV has approximately (-0.09), 9% negative influence on TOBIN’S Q. This means if 
ETHDIV increases by one (1) member of the three ethnic groups, then TOBIN’S Q would have 
9% negative change in value without considering the level of significance. The results of 
coefficient of NATDIV from the above table show that NATDIV has approximately 6% positive 
influence on TOBIN’S Q. This means if NATDIV increases by one (1) additional foreign 
director, then TOBIN’S Q would increase by approximately 6% in value without considering the 
level of significance. BODSIZE from the above table show that BODSIZE has approximately 
1% influence on TOBIN’S Q. This means if BODSIZE increases by one (1), then TOBIN’S Q 
would be 1% change in value. This implies that without considering significance level, if the 
board of a firm increases the number of directors there would be no change in the financial 
performance of that firm using TOBIN’S Q as the performance parameter 
 
In terms of the significance of probability we see NATDIV in the probability column reads 
(0.9780), which can be interpreted as 98% significance. The state of significance in probability 
starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. This, 
therefore, implies that NATDIV has no significant relationship with TOBIN’S Q meaning that if 
there is an increase in the number of foreign directors there would be no significant change in the 
financial performance using TOBIN’S Q. We can also see that ETHDIV, in the probability 
column reads (0.9279), which can be interpreted as 93% significance. The state of the 
significance in probability starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 
significance. This means that if there is an increase in the ethnicity of the board members there 
would be no significant change in the financial performance using TOBIN’S Q. This therefore 
implies that BODSIZE also has no significant relationship with TOBIN’S Q. We can also see 
that BODSIZE, in the probability column reads (0.9753), which can interpret as 98% 
significance. The state of significance in probability starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must 
not be greater than 0.05 significance. This therefore concludes that BODSIZE also has no 
significant relationship with TOBIN’S Q. This implies that regardless of the coefficient results, if 
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the board of a firm increases the number of directors there would be no change in the financial 
performance of that firm using TOBIN’S Q as the performance parameter 
 
R-squared (can explain variation). As we see, 0.042053 above shows that 4% variation of 
TOBIN’S Q can jointly be explained by ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE. In other words, 
ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE can jointly influence 42% variation of the outcome of 
TOBIN’S Q, which is a very little significant influence. 100%-4% = approximately 96% 
variation of TOBIN’S Q can be explained by outside variables not captured in the study. This 
percentage, 4%, is not reasonable, though diversity in board is highly dependent on the certain 
un-captured factor like the behavior of each member, personality, competence and so on that 
could influence the performance of a firm. The significance is also confirmed in the probability 
value of prob(F-statistic) 1.00, which is 100% i.e. it is not significant. The significance of 
probability must be below (0.05) 5%. 
4.4.2.3 Return on Equity 
The two stage least square formula imputed as a command to produce the regression is shown as 
follows: 
Command as imputed into Eviews8:  
 
LS LS(CX=F) ROE C ETHDIV NATDIV BODSIZE 
Estimation Equation: 
ROE = C(1) + C(2)*ETHDIV + C(3)*NATDIV + C(4)*BODSIZE + [CX=F] 
Substituted Coefficients: 
ROE = -1.62334644673 + 0.0592169584209*ETHDIV + 1.0734171275*NATDIV + 
0.0534474304737*BODSIZE + [CX=F] 
 
Table 4.6: Roe Regression Results 
 
 
    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
C -1.623346 10.67911 -0.152011 0.8794 
ETHDIV 0.059217 3.125660 0.018945 0.9849 
NATDIV 1.073417 6.760674 0.158774 0.8740 
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BODSIZE 0.053447 0.990901 0.053938 0.9570 
     
 Effects Specification   
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
     
     
R-squared 0.248236    Mean dependent var -0.384073 
Adjusted R-squared -0.018104    S.D. dependent var 6.700296 
S.E. of regression 6.760674    Durbin-Watson stat 2.197971 
Sum squared resid 7998.675    Akaike info criterion        6.882049 
Log likelihood -755.9639    Schwarz criterion 7.801180 
F-statistic 0.932028  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.618224        
     
 
 
Firstly, attention should be focused, on the coefficient, which describes the relationship, 
influence and the direction between the dependent variable (ROE) and the independent variables 
(ETHDIV, NATDIV), the control variable (BODSIZE). The results of coefficient of ETHDIV 
from the above table show that ETHDIV has approximately (0.06), 6% influence on ROE. This 
means if ETHDIV increases by one (1), then ROE would have 6% change in value. The results 
of coefficient of NATDIV from the above table show that NATDIV has approximately 100% 
positive influence on ROE. This means if NATDIV increases by one (1), then ROE would 
increase by 100% in value. BODSIZE from the above table show that BODSIZE has 
approximately 5% (0.05) influence on ROE. This means if BODSIZE increases by one (1), then 
ROE would be no 5% change in value 
 
In terms of the significance of probability we see NATDIV in the probability column reads 
(0.8740), which can be interpreted as 87% significance. The state of significance in probability 
starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. This, 
therefore, implies that NATDIV has no significant relationship with ROE. This implies that 
regardless of the coefficient results, if the board of a firm increases the number of  foreign 
directors there would be no change in the financial performance of that firm using ROE as the 
70 
 
performance parameter. We can also see that ETHDIV, in the probability column reads (0.9849), 
which can interpret as 98% significance. The state of significance in probability starts from 0.05 
(5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. This therefore concludes that 
BODSIZE also has no significant relationship with ROE. We can also see that BODSIZE, in the 
probability column reads (0.9570), which can interpret as 96% significance. The state of 
significance in probability starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 
significance. This therefore concludes that BODSIZE also has no significant relationship with 
ROE. This implies that regardless of the coefficient results, if the board of a firm increases the 
number of directors there would be no change in the financial performance of that firm using 
ROE as the performance parameter 
 
R-squared (can explain variation). As we see, 0.248236 above shows that 25% variation of ROE 
can jointly be explained by ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE. In other words, ETHDIV, 
NATDIV, and BODSIZE can jointly influence 25% variation of the outcome of ROE, which is a 
very little significant influence. 100%-25% = approximately 75% variation of ROE can be 
explained by outside variables not captured in the study. This percentage, 25%, is reasonable 
owing to the fact that this study is a behavioural inclined research where it involves the effect of 
dynamic and unpredictable variables like board of directors (humans).  The diversity in board is 
highly dependent on the certain un-captured factor like the behavior of each member, 
personality, competence and so on that could influence the performance of a firm. The 
significance is also confirmed in the probability value of prob (F-statistic), 0.618224 which is 
62% i.e. it is not significant. The significance of probability must be below (0.05) 5%. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The findings above is in agreement the findings of (Marimuthu and Koladaisamy, 2009; 
Darmadi, 2011) which report no significant relationship between foreign directors and firm 
financial performance and Omoye, Alade, &Eriki, 2013; Protasovs, 2015 which report no 
significant relationship between board ethnic diversity and firm financial performance. However, 
this study is not in agreement with the prior studies that suggest that ethnic diversity has a 
significant positive relationship with financial performance (Swartz and Firer, 2005; Nishii, 
Gotte & Raver, 2007; Marimuthu, 2008) and is also not in agreement with studies that suggest 
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that ethnic diversity has a significant positive relationship (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2001; Sanda, 
Garba & Mikailu, 2008 and Garba & Abubakar, 2014).  In the case of (Oxelheim & Randoy, 
2001; Sanda, Garba & Mikailu, 2008; Garba & Abubakar, 2014) it was observed that national 
diversity has a strong significant positive effect on the financial performance of the firms they 
sampled. This implies that both national and ethnic diversity has positive effect on the firm’s 
performance. Hence, when there is more foreign content and when there is a more diverse and 
balanced representation of the major ethnic groups on the board the firm financial performance is 
positively influenced towards an increase. 
Equally, (Schwizer, 2012, Zainal, Zulkifli, and  Saleh, 2013) concluded that the relationship 
between national diversity  in the board of a firm  and firm performance is a significant negative 
relationship which is also in disagreement with the results of this study. This implies that a 
percentage increase in the foreign content of the board of a firm results in an equal percentage 
decline in firm’s financial performance. This indicates an inverse relationship between national 
diversity and firm’s financial performance study which is not in disagreement with the results of 
this work. The studies of (Cimerovaa, doda, & Frijnsa, 2014) indicate that there can also be a 
negative relationship between ethnic diversity and firm performance. Finally, (Marimuthu and 
Koladaisamy, 2009: Darmadi, 2011) proved that ethnic diversity and financial performance has 
no significant relationship and (Protasovs, 2015) showed that national diversity and financial 
performance has no significant relationship of which both are consistent with this study’s result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
This study helps to provide evidence based on the effects of national diversity and ethnic 
diversity on firm financial performance of an emerging economy like Nigeria. This chapter 
brings to conclusion the argument earlier stated in the form of the hypothesis. And it provides 
answers to the research question stated in chapter one. This chapter shows the interpretation of 
the results in chapter four and links it up with other empirical research, showing its agreement or 
disagreement with them. This chapter advances through the following sequence of headings: 
Summary of analysis, Summary of Findings, Conclusion, Recommendation of study, 
Contribution to knowledge, Limitation of study, and Suggestion for further study 
5.1 Summary of analysis 
The study has been able to come with an analysis based on the main objectives of the study, 
which is to determine the influence of ethnic diversity as a variable on the firm’s performance 
and to Ascertain whether the presence of a foreign director (national diversity as another 
variable) affects firm’s performance using ROA, ROA and Tobin’s Q as financial measures. 
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Below represents the summary of the results from each regression analysis using the three 
financial measures mentioned above. 
 
 RO
A
 
R
O
E 
TO
BIN
’S 
Q
 
Coefficient 
R-squared 
 Probability 
Coefficient 
R-squared 
 Probability 
Coefficient 
R-squared 
 Probability 
NATDIV 0.124116  0.433793  0.3299  1.073417  0.248248
2  
0.8740  0.061619  0.04205  0.9780  
ETHDIV 0.078753  0.433793  0.1817  0.059217  0.2482 0.9849  -0.093407  0.04205  0.9279  
 
From the above, based on the results from the various financial performance measures we see 
that NATDIV and ETHDIV have no significant relationship with all the selected financial 
performance measure based on the values of their probability. With these results, we can 
therefore deduce that NATDIV and ETHDIV have no significant influence on the financial 
aspect of the firm’s performance. Firm performance was measured in the light of three basic 
representations, ROA, ROE, TOBIN’S Q to ensure validity and reliability of results. The results 
of the measurements of financial performance as shown in the summarized table above was all 
had different explanations as a result of various values in probability, R-squared and coefficient. 
ROA 
The above table shows that ETHDIV has approximately (0.08), 8% positive influence on ROA 
(i.e. Has no influence) and NATDIV has approximately 12% positive influence on ROA. This 
means if ETHDIV increases by one (1), then ROA would have 8% change in value and if 
NATDIV increases by one (1), then ROA would increase by approximately 12%. In value. 
BODSIZE from the above table show that BODSIZE has approximately 0% positive influence 
on ROA. This means if BODSIZE increases by one (1), then ROA would increase by 
approximately 0% in value. In terms of the significance of probability we see NATDIV (0.3299) 
and ETHDIV (0.1817) has no significant relationship with ROA. The state of significance in 
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probability starts from 0.05 (5%) and below. i.e. it must not be greater than 0.05 significance. 
This therefore implies that BODSIZE, (0.9887), also has no significant relationship with ROA. 
R-squared interpretation 
As we see, 0.433793 above shows that 43.4% variation of ROA can jointly be explained by 
ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE. In other words ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE can 
jointly influence 43% variation of the outcome of ROA, which is a very little significant 
influence. 100%-43% = approximately 57% variation of ROA can be explained by outside 
variables not captured in the study. Significance is also confirmed in the probability value of 
prob (F-statistic) 0.000046, which is 0% i.e. it is significant. The significance of probability must 
be below (0.05) 5%. 
 
TOBIN’S Q 
The results of coefficient of ETHDIV (-0.09), 9% negative influence on TOBIN’S Q. From the 
results of coefficient of NATDIV. NATDIV has approximately 6% positive influence on 
TOBIN’S Q. BODSIZE from the above table show that BODSIZE has approximately 1% 
influence on TOBIN’S Q. In terms of the significance of probability we see NATDIV (0.9780) 
in the probability column shows NATDIV has no significant relationship with TOBIN’S Q. We 
can also see that ETHDIV, in the probability column reads (0.9279) ETHDIV also has no 
significant relationship with TOBIN’S Q. We can also see that BODSIZE, in the probability 
column reads (0.9753), which shows that BODSIZE also has no significant relationship with 
ROE. 
R-squared interpretation 
As we see, 0.042053 above shows that 4% variation of TOBIN’S Q can jointly be explained by 
ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE. In other words ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE can 
jointly influence 42% variation of the outcome of TOBIN’S Q, which is a very little significant 
influence. 100%-4% = approximately 96% variation of TOBIN’S Q can be explained by outside 
variables not captured in the study. Significance is also confirmed in the probability value of 
prob (F-statistic) 1.00, which is 100% i.e. it is not significant. The significance of probability 
must be below (0.05) 5%. 
ROE 
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The results of coefficient of ETHDIV from the above table show that ETHDIV has 
approximately (0.06), has 6% influence on ROE. The results of coefficient of NATDIV from the 
above table show that NATDIV has approximately 100% positive influence on ROE. BODSIZE 
from the above table show that BODSIZE has approximately 5% (0.05) influence on ROE.  
In terms of significance of probability we see NATDIV and ETHDIV do not have significant 
relationships with ROE because the probability column reads (0.8740) and (0.9849), which can 
interpret as 87% and 98% respectively. They are both above the 5% significance level. This 
therefore implies that BODSIZE also has no significant relationship with ROE because the 
probability column reads (0.9570), which can interpret as 96%. 
R-squared interpretation 
As we see, 0.248236 above shows that 25% variation of ROE can jointly be explained by 
ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE. In other words ETHDIV, NATDIV, and BODSIZE can 
jointly influence 25% variation of the outcome of ROE, which is a very little significant 
influence. 100%-25% = approximately 75% variation of ROE can be explained by outside 
variables not captured in the study. Significance is also confirmed in the probability value of 
prob (F-statistic) , 0.618224 which is 62% i.e. it is not significant. The significance of probability 
must be below (0.05) 5%. 
 
5.2 Summary of Findings 
This study examined the effect of ethnic and national diversity (board diversity) in the board of a 
firm in the firm’s financial performance. During the process of seeking to examine this effect, we 
made use of financial performance measures such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and Tobin’s Q. The result showed an insignificant relationship between ethnic and 
financial performance, and also showed an insignificant relationship between national diversity 
financial performances. The result derived using all the three financial measures have no 
significant relationship with ethnic and national diversity. This is in agreement the findings of 
(Marimuthu and Koladaisamy, 2009; Darmadi, 2011 which report no significant relationship 
between foreign directors and firm financial performance and Omoye, Alade, &Eriki, 2013; 
Protasovs, 2015 which report no significant relationship between board ethnic diversity and firm 
financial performance. However, this study is not in agreement with the prior studies that suggest 
that ethnic diversity has a significant positive relationship with financial performance (Swartz 
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and Firer, 2005; Nishii, Gotte & Raver, 2007; Marimuthu, 2008) and is also not in agreement 
with studies that suggest that ethnic diversity has a significant positive relationship (Oxelheim 
and Randoy, 2001; Sanda, Garba & Mikailu, 2008 and Garba & Abubakar, 2014).   
 
Results of similar studies in Nigeria  
The study seeks to see the difference between its results and that of similar studies done within 
the same locality (Nigeria) and the study tries to consider why the outcome differs or are similar 
as analysed below:  
Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu & Nwakoby, (2012), carried out a similar study to this study. They made use 
of panel data of 122 quoted firms in the Nigerian stock exchange regardless of industrial 
differences. They focused on gender, ethnicity and nationality as board diversity using fixed 
effect generalized least square regression examining periods of 1991-2008 (17yrs) of which these 
periods are pre-IFRS adoption periods. Their results showed that national and ethnic diversity 
were positively linked to firms’, performance which is not in agreement with this study. 
 
A year later, Omoye, Alade, & Eriki, (2013) published their study on this same subject matter. 
They made use of 96 randomly selected from the Nigerian stock exchange, using ordinary least 
square regression using the individual ethnic groups for separate analysis. Results showed that 
the individual ethnic group (Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba) each had a negative association with firm 
performance. Garba & Abubakar, (2014) investigated gender, ethnic diversity and board size. 
Selected 12 listed insurance firms, using data period of 2004-2009 which were analysed using 
feasible generalized least square regression and random effects estimators. Results showed a 
positive link between the foreign directors and firms’ performance, but ethnic diversity had no 
significant impact on firms’ performance, of which this is in agreement with this study. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This study examined the effect of ethnic and national diversity (board diversity) in the board of a 
firm in the firm’s financial performance. We made use of financial performance measures rather 
than general performance measure. The selected financial measures were returning on asset 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. The result showed an insignificant relationship 
between ethnic and financial performance, and also showed an insignificant relationship between 
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national diversity financial performances. The result derived using all the three financial 
measures have no significant relationship with ethnic and national diversity. These imply that 
both national and ethnic diversity has no effect on the firm’s performance regardless of the 
number of foreign directors present at a board and also regardless of the level of ethnic diversity 
present in a board. Hence, when there is more foreign content and when there is a more diverse 
and balanced representation of the major ethnic groups on the board, the firm financial 
performance is not influenced towards an increase or decrease. The control variable for the study 
is IFRS and board size, IFRS based on the fact that the data collected was from financial 
reporting for the post IFRS adoption years (2012-2015).  The findings indicated that the average 
board size of the sixty (60) listed firms used was approximately (9) which explains that fact that 
on a average the minimum number of directors recommended by the new corporate governance 
code is attained. 
5.4 Recommendation of study 
Based on the results obtain from this study, we deduce that ethnic diversity and national diversity 
showed no significant influence on the financial performance of all the sixty (60) listed firms 
sampled. This result was based on the financial measurement variables that were used for the 
analysis and other factors that could have influenced the result as stated in the limitation to study 
above. The obvious implication of this study is that regardless of the presence of board diversity 
in terms of nationality and ethnicity, there will be no difference or change when it comes to the 
financial performance of a firm. In addition, this study has made recommendations based on the 
importance of two factors: The overall strength in the corporate governance (anchored on 
agency, stewardship and social identity theory, emphatic on interest of shareholders and board) 
of a firm and firm’s profitability-growth factor (anchored on stakeholders and resource 
dependency theory emphatic on resource for expansion and satisfaction of business community).  
 
Given the level of weak corporate governance in a business environment like Nigeria, firms 
should look to diversify their corporate board composition. Nigeria, being a diverse nation has 
firms with ethnic diversity amongst employees and management as well as at the ownership 
level, there will also be a need for diversity in board level of proper representation. However, if 
they also confirm that there is no traceable influence between demographic diversity and firm 
performance, this study still recommends that Nigerian firms should consider diversifying board 
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because it would be as a form of guard against the gang up of board members against owner as a 
result of conflict of interest as proven by social identity theory and agency theory. The firms that 
perform operations in Nigeria need to re-strategize when it comes to ethnic diversity in corporate 
boards as ethnically diverse board enhance productivity, accountability and performance making 
the board effective stewards. The reason is because if the Nigerian corporate governance adopts 
a policy of ensuring every board is composed of diverse ethnic group representations then 
diversity in board will be inevitable for the success of every business in Nigeria. However, 
despite the suggestion this, the latest Nigerian Corporate governance code 2016 is yet to 
incorporate such. 
 
Based on profitability-growth and in terms of National diversity, we can recommend that firm 
board should be composed of at least a foreign director, depending on the global market base and 
stakeholders reach. For every listed or a multinational firm, their market is global and has 
stakeholders in nations apart from base nation where it majorly operates. Boards make certain 
critical decision that affects the stakeholder and eventually affect the interest of the shareholders. 
There must be a proper representation of the key stakeholder in that board so as to voice the 
possible opinions of this stakeholder and fight for the shareholder’s interest which is backed up 
stakeholders theory. Since the board of directors is directly involved in issuing, restructuring, 
takeover exercises, introducing measures to enhance regulatory, transparency, accountability and 
independence, therefore a foreign director is advisably recommended for every listed firm, and a 
must for the success of every multinational. Foreign directors could be crucial when it comes to 
strategies such as merger and acquisition of a foreign firm and cross-listing in the international 
market for the purpose of expansion of the base and growth. Hence, the inclusion of a foreign 
board member should be seen not only as a low-budget alternative for firms that regard cross-
listing as too big a venture, but also as an important complement for firms where cross-listing 
already exists. Foreign director also facilitates vast initiatives, innovations, background 
knowledge, competence, rare skill/ability (e.g. Language) and resources to the board, supported 
by resource dependency theory. 
Finally, firms who have practically been able to trace a direct influence between diversity and 
performance in terms of cost and benefits should disregard the consideration of demographic 
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diversity if the cost outweighs the benefit which affirmed to the negative relationship between 
ethnic diversity and performance.  
 
5.5 Contribution to knowledge 
The filling in of gaps in literature stands as contribution to existing knowledge. This study was 
able to identify certain gaps in literature such as earlier identified in chapter one of the study. 
Gaps in the literature could be in the form of methods, population type and location, sample size, 
and time range, etc. The study’s additions to knowledge were based on these gaps. Firstly, 
majority of prior studies examined this topic in locations like Malaysia, Netherlands, Germany, 
New Zealand, Indonesia, U.K., U.S.A. and other developed countries. Just Only about three (3) 
to five (5) studies have focused on Nigeria thus far based on a similar topic. 
(Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu and Nwakoby, 2012) and (Garba & Abubakar, 2014) was able to combine 
ethnic diversity and national diversity, but Only Garba & Abubakar, 2014 made use of the three 
financial measures used in this study (ROE, ROA, and TOBIN’S Q) as shown in THE above 
table. Out of this Nigerian-focused studies, none were able to provide analysis and results for 
non-financial listed companies in the Nigerian stock exchange making use of OLS regression. 
This is the gap that this study was able to fill in thereby contributing to the knowledge of 
literature. 
5.6 Limitation of study 
This study has lots of limitations in the cause of running the study. The limitation to the study 
would be discussed under the following headings: Type of diversity Time frame of study, 
Number of years, financial performance measures Size of population, Location, Source of data 
Type of diversity: The next limitation of the study will be in terms of the aspects of diversity 
used. The diversity used for this study is demographic in context according to the classification 
made by (Peterson, 2000; Timmerman, 2000), they are ethnic diversity and national diversity. 
These types of diversities are referred to as demographic diversities because they are mostly 
attributed to physical characteristics, they can be inherited and can be used to trace an 
individual’s origin. This study made use of only ethnic diversity and national diversity. Ethnic 
diversity can be seen in many ways. One of the ways could be in form of racial diversity (where 
we have the black, white race, etc.), other ways of viewing ethnic diversity could be in form of 
nationality, tribe/ ethnic group (origin ,e.g. Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba), clan (divided by 
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indigenous language variety and village), and cultural diversity. The ethnic group was 
categorized in the form of the three basic ethnic groups in Nigeria, but in reality there are several 
ethnic groups in Nigeria that should be represented in future studies.  
 
Population and Location: The choice of  Nigeria as the focus of the study stands as a 
limitation because the study would be based on the financial information present on the firms 
listed on the Nigerian stock exchange. The use of the non-financial sectors which comprise of 10 
sectors, namely, services, industrial goods, consumer goods, natural resources, building/real 
estate, healthcare services, conglomerate, agriculture, ICT, and oil and gas. Though at least about 
50% of firms in each of these sectors were represented, there is always a need for a greater 
percentage representation of the sectors used to extract adequate and useful data needed for 
analysis.  
Methods used in data collection and Source of data: The study was also limited to the methods 
used in data collection and Source of data which was through secondary data method and the 
internet sources respectively (i.e. The listed firm’s published financial report on Nigerian stock 
exchange).  
The Number of reporting years of firms and Time frame of study: The study made use of data 
from the financial statement of 60 firms listed on the Nigerian stock exchange and the number of 
reporting years was four years (4 years) from 2012-2015 because 2012 was when the IFRS 
reporting year for listed companies began. The study was conducted within a space of seven 
months (6 months. November 2016 - April 2017) so far gone and the work is still in an ongoing 
process 
Financial performance measures: The study was limited to the measurements of ROA, ROE and 
TOBIN’S Q as financial measures of which are not all the possible measures that can be used to 
determine if a firm’s performance is good or bad. There are multiple measures of financial 
performance that can be made use for future research. This research only made use of 
profitability measures like ROA, ROE, ROCE and ROI, etc. Other Financial performance 
measures such as Growth (e.g. Asset growth, Market-share growth) & Market Value (e.g. stock 
price volatility, earnings per share) should be considered.  
The names of the board members were used as the main means of categorizing the board into the 
three basic ethnic groups. One of the limitations of this method is that nowadays as a result of 
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migration and relocation of various ethnic groups (into other regions not their origin), 
modernization, western influence, marriage, and national schemes (like NYSC), names are no 
more 100% reliable in determining ethnic origin. This is because he modern Nigeria people 
adopt names from other ethnic groups and westerners as a result of marriage, western influence, 
national scheme, relocation and so on. 
Model: The regression model in this study assumes there is a linear relationship between 
diversity and performance. There could be a curvilinear relationship. This is a limitation to this 
study. This also means diversity may result in adverse results for a certain period, followed by 
indifferent results, then positive relationships with regard to performance. 
 
5.7 Suggestion for further study 
The suggestion for future studies would be discussed under the following headings: Type of 
diversity Time frame of study, Number of years, financial performance measures Size of 
population, Location, Source of data 
Type of diversity: This study examined ethnic diversity and National diversity. Future studies 
should go farther in focusing on other forms of diversity such as background diversity (industrial 
experience). This knowledge-based form of diversity would be greatly needed in terms of board 
decisions and contributions. Such information about directors’ industrial backgrounds could be 
extracted from the curriculum vitae and biography. A combination of directors of various 
backgrounds regardless of race or any other form of diversity is crucial for creativity and 
innovation.  Ethnic diversity can be seen in many ways. The ethnic group was categorized in the 
form of the three basic ethnic groups in Nigeria, but in reality there are several ethnic groups in 
Nigeria that should be represented in future studies.  
Population and Location: The use of the non-financial sectors only was because of differences in 
regulations such as BOFIA and financial regulator like CBN. Nevertheless, future studies could 
examine a population of listed financial institutions in the Nigerian stock exchange only. 
 
The Number of reporting years of firms and Time frame of study: The study made use of data 
from the financial statement of 60 firms listed on the Nigerian stock exchange and the number of 
reporting years was four years (4 years) from 2012-2015. Future studies should expand the 
population of the number of firms beyond sixty (60) and the number of years should also 
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increase. Future studies should make us of IFRS adoption as a dummy variable, where a pre-
adoption and post-adoption examination would be analysed. 
Financial performance measures: There are multiple measures of financial performance that can 
be made use for future research. This research only made use of profitability measures like ROA, 
ROE, ROCE and ROI, etc. Other Financial performance measures such as Growth (e.g. Asset 
growth, Market-share growth) & Market Value (e.g. stock price volatility, earnings per share) 
should be considered. 
Model: There could be a curvilinear relationship. This is a limitation to this study. This also 
means diversity may result in adverse results for a certain period, followed by indifferent results, 
then positive relationships with regard to performance. This study needs to be expanded across 
specific industries with the comparism between the behavioral differences (in terms of effect of 
board-ethnic diversity) in these industries of which there are gaps to fill in respect to other 
countries  
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APPENDIX 
FIRMs 
Year                  ROE ROA TOBIN Q ETHDIV          
NATDIV 
      
BODSIZE 
PRESCO PLC 2012 0.153295 0.136555 0.890797 3 1 12 
PRESCO PLC 2013 0.055498 0.046929 0.845609 3 1 12 
PRESCO PLC 2014 0.1141 0.104259 0.913753 2 1 10 
PRESCO PLC 2015 0.047313 0.041833 0.884169 2 1 10 
FTN COCOA 2012 -0.20497 -0.09249 0.451232 2 0 6 
FTN COCOA 2013 -0.16882 -0.06283 0.372164 2 0 6 
FTN COCOA 2014 0.481564 0.130547 0.27109 2 0 6 
FTN COCOA 2015 -0.06274 0.424901 -6.77242 2 0 6 
LIVESTOCK FEED 2012 0.178853 -0.22754 -1.2722 3 0 8 
LIVESTOCK FEED 2013 0.998115 -0.12184 -0.12207 3 0 8 
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LIVESTOCK FEED 2014 0.102844 0.042618 0.41439 3 0 8 
LIVESTOCK FEED 2015 0.096427 0.041124 0.426478 3 0 8 
OKOMU OIL 2012 0.492836 0.44653 0.906042 2 1 9 
OKOMU OIL 2013 0.027803 0.023785 0.85549 2 1 9 
OKOMU OIL 2014 0.1234 0.072523 0.587706 2 1 9 
OKOMU OIL 2015 0.272956 0.150935 0.552963 2 1 9 
ELLAH LAKES 2012 -0.05062 -0.02764 0.54597 3 0 9 
ELLAH LAKES 2013 -0.04199 -0.02111 0.502666 3 0 9 
ELLAH LAKES 2014 -0.02043 -0.01166 0.570841 3 0 9 
ELLAH LAKES 2015 -0.06772 -0.0311 0.459313 3 0 9 
SCOA PLC 2012 0.02251 0.010376 0.460957 2 1 10 
SCOA PLC 2013 0.037604 0.013739 0.365366 2 1 10 
SCOA PLC 2014 0.058779 0.018113 0.308152 3 1 9 
SCOA PLC 2015 -0.6533 -0.12047 0.184404 3 1 9 
TRCP 2012 0.195451 0.125834 0.643814 3 0 7 
TRCP 2013 0.080274 0.046552 0.579914 3 0 7 
TRCP 2014 0.036814 0.019351 0.525634 3 0 7 
TRCP 2015 0.016502 0.007117 0.431307 3 0 7 
UACN 2012 0.116193 0.057259 0.492791 3 0 10 
UACN 2013 0.138946 0.079583 0.572761 3 0 10 
UACN 2014 1.457753 0.839554 0.575923 3 0 10 
UACN 2015 0.069929 0.040299 0.576284 3 0 10 
ABRICO PLC 2012 2.062 0.14 0.073 2 1 7 
ABRICO PLC 2013 5.068578 0.11132 0.021963 2 1 7 
ABRICO PLC 2014 1.277652 -0.05676 -0.04442 2 0 7 
ABRICO PLC 2015 3.706091 0.059846 0.016148 2 0 7 
FULLROADS 2012 0.224 0.051 0.137 3 1 5 
FULLROADS 2013 0.087242 0.011373 0.130359 3 1 5 
FULLROADS 2014 0.264465 0.03816 0.144293 3 1 5 
FULLROADS 2015 -0.78465 -0.06474 0.082509 3 1 5 
JULIUS BERG 2012 0.344183 0.02029 0.058953 3 1 11 
JULIUS BERG 2013 0.373356 0.034556 0.092556 3 1 11 
JULIUS BERG 2014 0.315758 0.032182 0.101919 3 1 11 
JULIUS BERG 2015 0.100451 0.009956 0.099116 3 1 11 
SKYSHELTER 2012 0.069 0.097 0.811 3 0 5 
SKYSHELTER 2013 0.045552 0.043829 0.962184 3 0 5 
SKYSHELTER 2014 0.056452 0.054696 0.9689 3 0 5 
SKYSHELTER 2015 0.088861 0.079143 0.890646 3 0 5 
SMART PROD 2012 0.21421 0.100687 0.470041 1 0 5 
SMART PROD 2013 0.19891 0.111217 0.559133 1 0 5 
SMART PROD 2014 0.194376 0.10544 0.542451 1 0 5 
SMART PROD 2015 0.228368 0.126817 0.555319 1 0 5 
7UP 2012 0.133445 0.032674 0.24485 3 1 10 
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7UP 2013 0.287053 0.058914 0.205239 3 1 10 
7UP 2014 0.371326 0.115185 0.310199 3 1 10 
7UP 2015 0.297731 0.105276 0.353594 3 1 10 
PZ 2012 0.059225 0.039419 0.665583 3 1 10 
PZ 2013 0.11459 0.073602 0.642312 3 1 10 
PZ 2014 0.033 0.021386 0.648075 3 1 10 
PZ 2015 0.018533 0.010704 0.577568 3 1 10 
FIDSON 2012 0.03957 0.01919 0.48497 3 0 8 
FIDSON 2013 0.029546 0.012659 0.428432 3 0 8 
FIDSON 2014 0.109591 0.040059 0.365528 3 0 8 
FIDSON 2015 0.11771 0.044653 0.379346 3 0 8 
GLAXOSMITH 2012 0.021 0.042 0.539 3 1 12 
GLAXOSMITH 2013 -0.03403 -0.01263 0.371224 3 1 12 
GLAXOSMITH 2014 0.020482 0.007824 0.381998 2 1 10 
GLAXOSMITH 2015 0.008808 0.00826 0.937777 2 1 10 
MORRISON 2012 -0.05049 -0.04193 0.830491 2 1 9 
MORRISON 2013 -0.24906 -0.18335 0.736139 2 1 9 
MORRISON 2014 -0.24906 -0.18335 0.736152 2 1 9 
MORRISON 2015 -0.4886 -0.25666 0.525289 2 1 9 
MAY&BAKER 2012 0.04521 0.01236 0.4539 3 0 6 
MAY&BAKER 2013 -0.03403 -0.01263 0.371224 3 0 6 
MAY&BAKER 2014 0.020482 0.007824 0.381998 3 0 6 
MAY&BAKER 2015 0.021864 0.00826 0.377768 3 0 6 
PHARMA DEKO 2012 0.074354 0.025208 0.339021 3 1 9 
PHARMA DEKO 2013 -0.26715 -0.08878 0.332326 3 1 9 
PHARMA DEKO 2014 0.108469 0.035576 0.327978 3 1 9 
PHARMA DEKO 2015 0.369295 0.256515 0.694607 3 1 9 
CWHG 2012 0.111431 0.029578 0.26544 2 1 7 
CWHG 2013 0.121381 0.045571 0.375436 2 1 7 
CWHG 2014 0.024179 0.008795 0.363744 2 1 7 
CWHG 2015 -0.58633 -0.17061 0.290975 2 1 7 
ETRANZACT 2012 0.053607 0.03888 0.725287 2 0 6 
ETRANZACT 2013 0.074802 0.053586 0.716371 2 0 6 
ETRANZACT 2014 0.136606 0.087451 0.640168 2 0 8 
ETRANZACT 2015 0.202607 0.120795 0.596206 2 0 8 
TRIPLE G&CO 2012 0.004266 0.003734 0.875357 3 0 7 
TRIPLE G&CO 2013 0.012887 0.011281 0.875357 3 0 7 
TRIPLE G&CO 2014 0.01037 0.008851 0.853525 3 0 7 
TRIPLE G&CO 2015 0.026533 0.022579 0.850997 3 0 7 
COURTVILLE 2012 0.148019 0.048019 0.801925 3 0 11 
COURTVILLE 2013 0.107578 0.07055 0.655805 3 0 11 
COURTVILLE 2014 0.095546 0.067269 0.704052 3 0 11 
COURTVILLE 2015 0.021023 0.014926 0.709984 3 0 11 
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ENAMELWARE 2012 0.062478 0.033571 0.537326 2 1 7 
ENAMELWARE 2013 0.069391 0.027936 0.402585 2 1 7 
ENAMELWARE 2014 0.056952 0.014805 0.259949 2 1 7 
ENAMELWARE 2015 0.094625 0.029402 0.310719 2 1 7 
ASHAKA 2012 0.041925 0.024926 0.899489 2 1 9 
ASHAKA 2013 0.060394 0.042245 0.699489 2 1 9 
ASHAKA 2014 0.089085 0.063845 0.716677 2 1 9 
ASHAKA 2015 0.052146 0.039282 0.753313 2 1 9 
AUSTIN LAZ 2012 0.030956 0.026822 0.866464 1 0 6 
AUSTIN LAZ 2013 0.003881 0.003179 0.819171 1 0 6 
AUSTIN LAZ 2014 -0.0888 -0.07786 0.876839 1 0 6 
AUSTIN LAZ 2015 -0.03414 -0.03163 0.926553 1 0 6 
BERG 2012 0.110637 0.067416 0.609344 3 1 12 
BERG 2013 0.103192 0.071069 0.688705 3 1 12 
BERG 2014 0.060495 0.04088 0.675751 3 1 12 
BERG 2015 0.127667 0.084786 0.664121 3 1 12 
NIGERIAN ROPE 2012 -2.29264 -0.25052 0.109269 2 0 9 
NIGERIAN ROPE 2013 1.434969 -0.30282 -0.21103 2 0 9 
NIGERIAN ROPE 2014 0.337349 -0.28905 -0.85683 2 0 9 
NIGERIAN ROPE 2015 0.60899 -0.22678 -0.37239 2 0 9 
UNDC 2012 -0.01726 -0.22954 13.29996 3 0 8 
UNDC 2013 0.01 0.136693 13.52062 3 0 8 
UNDC 2014 0.077 -0.98514 -12.8414 3 0 8 
UNDC 2015 0.002 -0.03844 -17.4541 3 0 8 
BOCG 2012 0.185 0.115025 0.620719 1 1 6 
BOCG 2013 0.144 0.091005 0.631538 1 1 6 
BOCG 2014 0.059 0.035451 0.592966 1 1 6 
BOCG 2015 0.108 0.070681 0.656809 1 1 6 
ABCT 2012 0.147516 0.065176 0.441825 3 0 10 
ABCT 2013 0.133846 0.054166 0.404688 3 0 10 
ABCT 2014 -0.20699 -0.05793 0.27985 3 0 10 
ABCT 2015 0.072167 0.02233 0.309417 3 0 10 
AVCN 2012 0.040351 0.007561 0.187374 2 0 8 
AVCN 2013 -0.05284 -0.01061 0.200858 2 0 8 
AVCN 2014 0.009028 0.001564 0.173184 2 0 8 
AVCN 2015 -0.00457 -0.00068 0.148253 2 0 8 
JULI PLC 2012 0.119749 0.115025 0.960546 2 0 6 
JULI PLC 2013 0.144101 0.091005 0.631538 2 0 9 
JULI PLC 2014 0.112083 0.066461 0.592965 2 0 9 
JULI PLC 2015 0.060243 0.039568 0.656809 2 0 9 
CAPH 2012 0.131653 0.055546 0.421913 1 1 10 
CAPH 2013 0.051833 0.026172 0.504923 1 1 10 
CAPH 2014 0.070929 0.035025 0.493799 1 1 10 
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CAPH 2015 0.124094 0.065078 0.524426 1 1 10 
CAVN 2012 #DIV/0! 0.2183 #DIV/0! 3 1 11 
CAVN 2013 0.164763 0.047697 0.289489 3 1 11 
CAVN 2014 0.082076 0.026738 0.325772 3 1 11 
CAVN 2015 0.078516 0.02501 0.318535 3 1 11 
CEMENT CO. 2012 0.156579 0.083983 0.536364 2 1 9 
CEMENT CO. 2013 0.157093 0.09454 0.60181 2 1 9 
CEMENT CO. 2014 0.203094 0.121569 0.598584 2 1 9 
CEMENT CO. 2015 0.118397 0.070048 0.591639 2 1 9 
CHAM 2012 0.019498 0.010042 0.515014 2 1 9 
CHAM 2013 0.040289 0.017583 0.436408 2 1 9 
CHAM 2014 0.040917 0.023316 0.569838 2 1 9 
CHAM 2015 -1.01519 -0.3978 0.391847 2 1 9 
CILS 2012        0.183 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 3 1 7 
CILS 2013 0.031572 0.008456 0.267841 3 1 7 
CILS 2014 0.054352 0.013521 0.248763 3 1 7 
CILS 2015 0.02615 0.005081 0.194309 3 1 7 
COND 2012 0.045653 0.008604 0.188472 2 1 10 
COND 2013 0.170207 0.037271 0.218975 2 1 10 
COND 2014 0.05184 0.009636 0.185881 2 1 10 
COND 2015 0.130299 0.033256 0.255229 2 1 10 
ETNA 2012 0.147935 0.028494 0.192609 2 0 4 
ETNA 2013 0.098893 0.038525 0.389561 2 0 4 
ETNA 2014 0.153152 0.069455 0.453505 2 0 4 
ETNA 2015 0.131974 0.044742 0.339022 2 0 4 
FIRA 2012 0.008956 0.010954 1.223107 3 1 8 
FIRA 2013 -0.08015 -0.11719 1.462074 3 1 8 
FIRA 2014 0.002421 0.003517 1.452648 3 1 8 
FIRA 2015 0.009437 0.013433 1.423485 3 1 8 
NNIG 2012 0.140215 0.062136 0.44315 3 1 13 
NNIG 2013 0.131655 0.071494 0.543043 3 1 13 
NNIG 2014 -1.48839 -0.46657 0.313471 3 1 13 
NNIG 2015 -0.64621 -0.49791 0.770511 3 1 13 
FORTE OIL 2012 0.132867 0.023699 0.178366 2 0 9 
FORTE OIL 2013 0.11817 0.047808 0.404567 2 0 9 
FORTE OIL 2014 0.100522 0.032007 0.318409 2 0 9 
FORTE OIL 2015 0.125194 0.047587 0.380104 2 0 9 
GRIF 2012 0.12952 0.061667 0.476122 1 1 6 
GRIF 2013 -0.78444 0.044879 -0.05721 1 1 6 
GRIF 2014 0.128903 0.065449 0.507737 1 1 6 
GRIF 2015 0.073272 0.034405 0.469548 1 1 6 
GUINESS 2012 0.368145 0.134088 0.364226 3 1 15 
GUINESS 2013 0.257688 0.097998 0.380298 3 1 15 
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GUINESS 2014 0.212453 0.072346 0.34053 3 1 15 
GUINESS 2015 0.161247 0.063764 0.395441 3 1 14 
BETA 2012 0.106664 0.059162 0.554662 2 1 9 
BETA 2013 0.106691 0.054013 0.506255 2 1 9 
BETA 2014 0.149829 0.088762 0.592422 2 1 9 
BETA 2015 0.113273 0.073281 0.646943 2 1 9 
INLK 2012 -0.05695 -0.03455 0.606587 2 1 12 
INLK 2013 0.013818 0.00825 0.597058 2 1 12 
INLK 2014 0.007722 0.005415 0.701221 2 1 12 
INLK 2015 0.010828 0.007771 0.717703 2 1 12 
BRIS 2012 -0.0896 -0.01989 0.221977 3 0 8 
BRIS 2013 -0.03017 -0.00601 0.199075 3 0 8 
BRIS 2014 0.559353 0.096157 0.171907 3 0 8 
BRIS 2015 -102.647 0.299986 -0.00292 3 0 8 
PORT 2012 -0.29407 -0.09571 0.325465 3 0 6 
PORT 2013 0.121571 0.04927 0.405281 3 0 6 
PORT 2014 0.160762 0.065263 0.405962 3 0 6 
PORT 2015 -0.33687 -0.12267 0.364146 3 0 6 
JPUL 2012 -0.45024 -0.20857 0.463233 3 0 9 
JPUL 2013 0.015734 0.006183 0.392956 3 0 9 
JPUL 2014 -0.20796 -0.06731 0.323683 3 0 7 
JPUL 2015 -2.30383 -0.23715 0.102937 3 0 7 
LIVE 2012 0.227537 0.069537 0.305605 2 0 13 
LIVE 2013 0.121838 0.057415 0.471239 2 0 13 
LIVE 2014 0.128116 0.044182 0.344859 2 0 8 
LIVE 2015 0.096427 0.041124 0.426478 2 0 8 
LARFARGE 2012 0.215211 0.09682 0.449885 2 1 11 
LARFARGE 2013 0.304041 0.175484 0.577171 2 1 11 
LARFARGE 2014 0.191996 0.081309 0.423496 2 1 11 
LARFARGE 2015 0.153767 0.059597 0.387581 2 1 11 
MOBIL 2012 0.43677 0.085756 0.196342 3 1 7 
MOBIL 2013 0.364953 0.085463 0.234176 3 1 7 
MOBIL 2014 0.347529 0.118227 0.340193 2 1 6 
MOBIL 2015 0.463299 0.09899 0.213663 2 1 6 
MORS 2012 0.022301 0.016783 0.752563 3 1 9 
MORS 2013 -0.04619 -0.03345 0.724264 3 1 9 
MORS 2014 -0.24922 -0.18335 0.735695 3 1 9 
MORS 2015 -0.4886 -0.25666 0.525289 3 1 9 
MRSO 2012 0.010765 0.00369 0.342725 3 1 8 
MRSO 2013 0.03232 0.009657 0.298794 3 1 8 
MRSO 2014 0.036918 0.012903 0.349513 3 1 8 
MRSO 2015 0.044602 0.013987 0.313592 3 1 8 
MANS 2012 0.008137 0.005584 0.686311 2 1 5 
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MANS 2013 -0.1171 -0.05625 0.480388 2 1 5 
MANS 2014 0 0 0.999017 2 1 5 
MANS 2015 -0.59638 0.132214 -0.22169 2 1 5 
MULV 2012 0.011345 0.005584 0.492236 3 1 21 
MULV 2013 -0.25525 -0.11016 0.431569 3 1 21 
MULV 2014 -0.34532 -0.11653 0.337453 3 1 21 
MULV 2015 -0.30001 -0.08168 0.272265 3 1 21 
BECO 2012 -1.25697 -0.70687 0.56236 1 1 7 
BECO 2013 -0.12261 -0.07074 0.576966 1 1 7 
BECO 2014 -0.12261 -0.07074 0.576966 2 1 7 
BECO 2015 0.421457 0.200341 0.475353 2 1 7 
PREM 2012 -2.54073 -0.10361 0.040778 2 1 10 
PREM 2013 2.288282 -0.07394 -0.03231 2 1 10 
PREM 2014 -7.07874 0.027998 -0.00396 2 1 10 
PREM 2015 -1.14007 -0.08643 0.07581 2 1 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  ROE   
Date: 03/08/17   Time: 15:03  
Sample: 2012 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0  
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -30.3420  0.0000  58  174 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  93.2359  0.0063  58  174 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  97.7944  0.0025  58  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  TOBIN_Q   
Date: 03/08/17   Time: 16:04  
Sample: 2012 2015   
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Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0  
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -104.621  0.0000  58  174 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  144.922  0.0000  58  174 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  169.121  0.0000  58  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  ROA    
Date: 03/08/17   Time: 16:06  
Sample: 2012 2015   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -30.6269  0.0000  58  174 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  82.2523  0.0436  58  174 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  90.0950  0.0114  58  174 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
